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Abstract
Several studies have examined the ability of the Rey 15-Item Memory Test
(MFIT) to identify malingering of memory problems among a variety of psychiatric
and neurologically impaired populations. The consensus has been that the quantitative
scoring method is overly sensitive to genuine memory impairment and lacks
sensitivity to simulated amnesia. However, a reexamination of these studies and
available data indicates the MFIT is both valid and effective at identifying actual
malingerers among civil litigants, and a number of these studies were limited through
inappropriate inclusion of severely impaired patients and research designs of
questionable validity. Also, the performance of a group for whom malingering of
memory complaints is a relevant issue (criminal defendants) has been overlooked.
The present study expands upon previous investigations by comparing the MFIT
performance of a known group of forensic malingerers to a group of non-malingering
pretrial criminal defendants and non-malingering post-trial forensic inpatients, and by
examining the utility of a qualitative scoring approach hypothesized to enhance the
MFIT’s detection ability.
Using the quantitative method, a low sensitivity of 47.7% was obtained for
malingerers. Minimal improvement was found when qualitative scoring was
incorporated (56.8%), although confidence in correct identification was increased with
very low total scores (<5) and failure to recall at least 3 of the first 6 items. While the
quantitative method yielded high specificity for non-malingering post-trial patients
(86.7%), this was not the case for the more clinically relevant non-malingering pretrial
patients (56.2%). However, specificity was increased for both non-malingering
groups through the addition of qualitative scoring. Although both the quantitative and
vi

combined quantitative and qualitative scoring methods were found to be accurate at
identifying criminal forensic malingerers, neither was found to be more accurate than
base rate prediction alone. It is concluded that the lack of effectiveness can be
attributed to 1) decreased sensitivity to less blatant forms of malingering, and 2) the
adverse impact of lower intelligence and psychiatric symptoms affecting the ability to
attend and organize cognitive processes on the MFIT recall for actual patients.
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Introduction
Malingering is defined as the “intentional production of false or grossly
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives
such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation,
evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs (American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 1994). It is recognized that a variety of somatic (e.g., chronic pain),
psychiatric (e.g., psychosis), and neurocognitive (e.g., amnesia, low intelligence)
symptoms are susceptible to being feigned (Main & Spanswick, 1995; Resnick, 1993;
Schretlen, Van Gorp, Wilkins, & Bobholz, 1992). Given the potential losses to
society for successful malingering, conservatively estimated to be a $5.36 billion
annual cost in the U.S.A. (Gouvier, Lees-Haley, & Hammer, in press), it is not
surprising that a great amount of effort has gone into the clinical identification of
malingerers. One method has been in the use of existing psychological assessment
instruments, for example using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI) to detect feigning of chronic pain (Dush, Simons, Platt, Nation, & Ayres,
1994). Another method has involved the development of new instruments specifically
for the detection of malingering, with examples including the M-Test (Beaber,
Marston, Michelli, & Mills, 1985) and Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms
(SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) to detect feigned psychosis, and the Dot
Counting Test (DCT; Rey, 1941) to detect feigned neurocognitive impairment.
Neuropsychologists have been increasingly called upon to evaluate for
malingering within legal settings (Bernard, 1990). Among civil litigants and disability
claimants, the prevalence for malingering of cognitive deficits has been noted to vary
widely, with estimates ranging between 15 to 64% (Greiffenstein, Baker, & Gola,
1

1994; Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993). Within criminal forensic settings, prevalence
estimates for the malingering of psychosis and associated cognitive deficits are within
a narrower range. Rogers (1986) provided a prevalence estimate of 4.5% for definite
malingering and 20% for suspected malingering among criminal defendants being
evaluated for insanity. A survey of 320 highly experienced forensic experts (Rogers,
Sewell, & Goldstein, 1994) found that 15.7% of forensic evaluatees were classified as
malingering, and a more recent survey of 221 forensic experts yielded a similar
estimate of 17.4% (Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998).
Amnesia is one of the more frequently malingered neuropsychological
symptoms among both civil and criminal litigants. However, the simulation of
chronic organic amnesia (e.g., severe anterograde amnesia due to traumatic brain
injury) has typically been associated with compensation litigation, whereas the
simulation of limited forms of amnesia (i.e., amnesia specific to the crime itself) has
been more frequently associated with criminal cases (Schacter, 1986a). For example,
in a review of legal cases, Schacter (1986b) noted that between 30 to 65% of
individuals convicted of homicide claimed limited amnesia for the crime. Moreover,
he noted there was no case in which an individual with chronic organic amnesia had
come before the court on a serious criminal matter.
This was corroborated by Rubinsky and Brandt (1986), who found no case in
which amnesia, in and of itself, was determined to have rendered an individual
incompetent to stand trial or to have negated criminal responsibility. Rather,
simulated amnesia is typically seen as part of insanity pleas. As Rubinsky and Brandt
noted, several state courts have held the position that “amnesia is sometimes an
incident of insanity” (p. 30). This is consistent with current research, which has
2

shown that individuals with certain psychiatric conditions (e.g., schizophrenia, major
depression) have associated cognitive deficits involving memory and attention (e.g.,
Malloy & Duffy, 1994). As such, pretrial criminal defendants have been noted to
malinger psychosis and associated cognitive impairment in order to be found
incompetent to stand trial, demonstrate diminished criminal responsibility, obtain an
insanity verdict, or to mitigate sentencing (Gothard, Rogers, & Sewell, 1995; Resnick,
1997; Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986; Schacter, 1986a; 1986b).
The consensus in the legal community is that memory impairment is easily
faked, yet almost impossible to disprove (Wiggins & Brandt, 1988). However, there is
a paucity of empirical investigation substantiating this position with respect to
criminal defendants. Nonetheless, several investigators offer encouragement that
criminal defendants attempting to malinger memory impairment may be identifiable
through existing neuropsychological and malingering measures. For example, Rogers
and Cruise (1998) postulated these individuals are more likely to be extreme in their
presentations, given that only grossly psychotic (and thus cognitively impaired)
presentations have a good probability of achieving the proper goal. This is especially
relevant for individuals accused of violent crimes (e.g., homicide), who have more at
stake in terms of being convicted and thus more likely to overplay their role (Schacter,
1986a). Furthermore, these contentions should be considered within the context of
common erroneous perceptions about amnesia. For example, Iverson (1995) found
that individuals instructed to simulate amnesia would often fake total amnesia (i.e.,
personal information, mother’s maiden name), and 10% stated they would completely
forget presented material. Also, laypersons often do not distinguish between the
etiologically distinct amnestic disorders, and thus are more likely to present with
3

inconsistent symptoms (e.g., severe retrograde amnesia in conjunction with mild head
injury) (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986; Wiggins &
Brandt, 1988).
Despite the finding that criminal defendants are likely to simulate limited as
opposed to chronic amnesia, Schacter (1986a) acknowledged these individuals may
also simulate memory impairment on current assessments to further substantiate their
claims. Still, other confounds must be considered. Individuals already having a
psychiatric condition and cognitive deficits may simply exaggerate existing
impairment, making the task of separating true deficits far more difficult (Pachana,
Boone, & Ganzell, 1998). As pointed out by Hayes, Hilsabeck, and Gouvier (1999), it
is not uncommon for attorneys to coach their clients with regard to psychological and
neuropsychological assessments. Likewise, malingerers may receive factual
information from a variety of sources (i.e., other patients, health care professionals), as
well as having prior legal and assessment experiences, which could contribute to more
sophisticated presentations.
Thus, while it is possible that criminal defendants who attempt to malinger
problems with memory can be identified with existing assessments, the presence of
potential confounds makes consistently accurate identification difficult. Rogers,
Harrell, and Liff (1993) have identified six systematic strategies that may prove useful
for improving the detection of feigning. These include (1) the “performance curve”
strategy, which assumes that malingerers will not consider item difficulty in choosing
which questions to fail (i.e., failing easy items while passing more difficult ones). A
more commonly employed strategy known as (2) “symptom validity testing” involves
presenting items with two forced-choice alternatives, with the assumption that
4

malingerers will fail the items at a below-chance level of performance (i.e., only
getting 10% of the items right whereas one would get 50% right by randomly
guessing). The (3) “magnitude of error” strategy simply assumes there will be
qualitative differences between malingerers and bona fide patients in the types of
wrong responses made. Two similar strategies which have received little empirical
focus include (4) “atypical (symptom) presentation” and (5) “psychological sequelae”
(i.e., the presence of psychological symptoms not typically associated with a given
neurological insult).
The final method is referred to by Rogers et al. (1993) as (6) the “floor effect”
strategy, which assumes the individual attempting to malinger will fail at a task which
even grossly impaired individuals are likely to perform adequately. This has relevance
for forensic malingering evaluations, given the presumption that individuals
attempting to feign insanity are more likely to overplay their role in an effort to appear
more disturbed (Resnick, 1997; Rogers & Cruise, 1998). One such measure, the Rey
Fifteen-Item Memory Test (Rey, 1964), has been the focus of empirical investigations
for more than a decade.

5

The Rey Fifteen-Item Memory Test
In 1964, Andre Rey described a screening measure designed to detect memory
malingering. Although never formally named by Rey, it has been referred to as the
“Rey Memory Test” (Goldberg & Miller, 1986), the “Rey 15-Item Memory Test”
(Back et al., 1996), and “Rey’s 15-Item Visual Memory Test” (Arnett, Hammeke, &
Schwartz, 1995). For purposes of clarity, Rey’s measure will be referred to
throughout the remainder of this text as the “Memory for Fifteen Items Test” (MFIT),
which is its most commonly used name (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Hayes, Hale, &
Gouvier, 1998). The MFIT is a measure of immediate span of apprehension (i.e.,
short-term memory) (Leng & Parkin, 1995). It consists of an 8.5” x 11” card on which
are printed 15 items (letters, numbers, and shapes) arranged in 3 columns and 5 rows
(Appendix A). The examinee is told there are 15 different (emphasized) items to
remember, which are to be reproduced immediately on a blank sheet of paper
following a 10-second exposure to the stimulus card. Although it is presented as a
difficult task, it is actually quite simple because there is redundancy among items that
reduces the amount of information to be remembered (i.e., three main ideas). Thus,
the MFIT relies upon the floor effect strategy for detecting malingering (Rogers et al.,
1993), which assumes the naive malingerer will be misled into overplaying their role
and choose to perform poorly on this very simple task.
Immediate memory span is an aspect of memory typically preserved, even in
individuals with severe organic amnesia (Leng & Parkin, 1995). Although the
assumption underlying the MFIT has intuitive appeal, empirical investigation is
necessary to demonstrate validity and effectiveness for this purpose. Rogers et al.
(1993) described three study designs through which this can be accomplished.
6

“Simulation designs” are analogue studies which involve instructing normal subjects
to feign (simulate) a particular disorder, the performance of which can then be
compared to that of individuals with the disorder. In a “known-groups” design, the
performance of actual malingerers (identified by independent clinicians) is compared
to that of individuals with and without the given disorder. Finally, “differential
prevalence” designs involve making comparisons with a group assumed to be
malingering based solely upon the context of the evaluation (i.e., presumption that
individuals seeking compensation for head injury are more likely to malinger
neuropsychological sequela).
In the following sections, empirical investigations from each of these
categories, as well as strictly normative studies of the MFIT, will be examined.
Particular emphasis will be placed on the instrument’s sensitivity (i.e., percentage of
malingerers correctly identified) and specificity (i.e., percentage of non-malingering
patients correctly identified). This will be followed by an examination of the validity
and effectiveness of the MFIT in detecting malingered memory deficits among various
populations, in addition to the improved prospects offered through an alternative
qualitative scoring method. Finally, the present study will be presented and these
issues discussed in relation to use of the MFIT among pre- and post-trial forensic
inpatients.

7

Definition of Statistical Terms
Before discussing investigations of the MFIT, a definition of the statistical
concepts to be used throughout the remainder of the text is in order. Cutoff scores are
often used with psychological tests to make decisions concerning the presence or
absence of a given condition. Using the MFIT and malingering status as an example,
scores falling below the cutoff of nine items are assumed to indicate malingering,
whereas scores at or above the cutoff are assumed to not be indicative of malingering.
A “true positive” occurs when an individual who is malingering is correctly identified
as malingering by their test performance (falling below the cutoff); the perentage of
true positives is referred to as the sensitivity of the test. Conversely, a “true negative”
occurs when an individual who is not malingering is correctly identified as such. The
percentage of true negatives is known as the specificity of the test. When an
individual who is not malingering is incorrectly classified as malingering by the test, a
false positive (Type I error) is said to occur, whereas a “false negative” or Type II
error occurs when a malingerer is misclassified as not malingering. An illustration of
these concepts is provided in Table 1.
Table 1
Classification Table for the MFIT

Predicted Condition
(based on MFIT scores)

Actual Condition
Malingering

Not Malingering

Malingering
(less than 9 items)

True Positive
(Sensitivity)

False Positive
(Type I Error)

Not Malingering
(9 or more items)

False Negative
(Type II Error)

True Negative
(Specificity)
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Gouvier, Hayes, and Smiroldo (1998), citing Faust and Nurcombe (1989),
recommended a useful strategy for determining if a test is a valid and effective
indicator of malingering. A test is considered a valid (accurate) indicator if the
sensitivity divided by the false negative error rate exceeds the false positive error rate
divided by the specificity. If a measure is an effective indicator (i.e., more accurate
than the base rate), the base rate for the condition (i.e., number of malingerers divided
by the total population) will be greater than the combined error rate (false positive +
false negative) for the instrument. However, in situations where the base rate exceeds
50%, the equation for determining effectiveness becomes (1 – base rate > false
positive + false negative). An important point is that while a test may be valid, it may
still not be an effective indicator.

9

Normative Studies
It was first suggested by Lezak (1976) that a cutoff of less than nine items
(three rows) correctly recalled on the MFIT be used in suspecting malingering, as only
“significantly deteriorated patients” would recall fewer items. However, this
suggestion was apparently based upon clinical observations rather than empirical fact.
It was not until 10 years later that the first empirical investigation of the MFIT was
conducted. In an effort to establish normative data, Goldberg and Miller (1986)
examined the performance of 50 acutely disturbed psychiatric inpatients and 16
mentally retarded individuals on the MFIT. While none of the psychiatric inpatients
fell below the suggested cutoff of nine items, 37.5% of the mentally retarded sample
did. Furthermore, the authors recommended using the total number of items correct,
as a greater number of individuals in both groups failed to meet the 3-row criterion.
These findings raised an important issue regarding the influence of intellect on MFIT
performance, as none of the psychiatric inpatients had IQ estimates in the mentally
retarded range (mean IQ of 101.1, range of 70 to 123).
While the study of Goldberg and Miller (1986) offered some utility in
investigating Lezak’s (1976) claim pertaining to “significantly deteriorated”, it failed
to examine the MFIT with respect to a population with demonstrated memory
impairment. Assuming that individuals feigning memory impairment would most
likely attempt to imitate individuals with brain damage, Bernard and Fowler (1990)
investigated the MFIT with 18 predominately diffuse head injury patients with
significant memory impairment (M time postinjury = 18.9 weeks) and 16 normal
controls. Using the 9-item cutoff, it was found that 11.2% of the patients with head
injuries would have been incorrectly suspected of malingering (i.e., specificity of
10

88.8%), as compared to none of the controls. However, the authors noted that
lowering the cutoff to less than eight items correctly recalled resulted in none of the
head-injured patients being incorrectly classified; they subsequently recommended
using this more conservative score.
Morgan (1991) conducted a normative study to establish the effect of true
memory impairment on MFIT performance. The MFIT was administered to 60
neurology patients, none of whom were involved in litigation or disability
proceedings, along with measures of new learning ability and memory. The sample
consisted primarily of individuals with alcoholic encephalopathy and probable
dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, and all subjects were tested (where relevant) at a
minimum of 1-month postinsult (e.g., after encephalitis or termination of alcohol
consumption). Morgan found that 12 patients (20%) failed to achieve the criterion of
at least nine figures correctly recalled (M=5.4). A closer inspection of the data
revealed that among those failing the MFIT, 92% obtained average memory
impairment ratings in the severe to profound range, and the MFIT failure participants
were significantly older. Morgan additionally noted there was no greater sensitivity of
MFIT performance to verbal or nonverbal memory impairment, as the majority of
subjects demonstrated global impairment. Morgan concluded that Lezak’s (1976)
claim regarding significantly deteriorated was supported, as only individuals with the
most severe memory impairment failed to achieve the suggested cutoff.
Based upon the findings of Goldberg and Miller (1986) concerning the
influence of intellect on MFIT performance, Hays, Emmons, and Lawson (1993)
sought to provide ability-based norms for this measure. Among a sample of 300 adult
psychiatric inpatients, it was found that IQ and age correlated highly with the total
11

number of items recalled on the MFIT (r=.60 and -.29, respectively), which taken
together accounted for 43% of the variance in MFIT scores. Although the
investigators failed to mention the diagnostic makeup of their sample, it was noted that
72 % of individuals with an IQ lower than 65 fell below the 9-item cutoff. This is
almost double the number of subjects falling below the cutoff in the Goldberg and
Miller (1986) study, who had an average IQ of 63.4 (range between 40 and 69).
A more recent normative investigation of the MFIT was conducted by Back et
al. (1996). Under the premise that individuals feigning psychosis often feign cognitive
impairment as well, Back et al. examined the performance of 30 individuals with
schizophrenia on the MFIT. Using the 9-item cutoff, they found that 13% of the
sample would have been incorrectly suspected of malingering. A regression analysis
revealed MFIT performance to be unrelated to patients’ mental and psychiatric status
(as determined through performance on the Mini-Mental State Examination and
ratings on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale), although education accounted for 37%
of the variance in scores.
With the exception of the study by Morgan (1991), a major shortcoming
common to normative studies has been the assumption that participants had no
incentive(s) for feigning/exaggerating their complaints (e.g., gaining staff attention,
acquiring better services, etc.). Nonetheless, they provide evidence that the specificity
of the MFIT is compromised by one’s level of intellect, particularly when intellectual
deficiency is superimposed upon a psychiatric condition. Furthermore, individuals
with severe memory impairment do perform below the suggested cutoff at a rather
high rate. The MFIT therefore appears to be of limited utility in detecting
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feigning/exaggeration of memory complaints among individuals with an established
history of psychiatric impairment or intellectual deficiency.
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Simulation Design Studies
The first study of the MFIT using a simulation design was conducted by
Bernard (1990). Using a sample of college students, the performance of a control
group was compared to that of a group instructed to “fake believable memory
impairments” without financial incentive, and a group instructed to fake memory
impairment with a financial incentive, across multiple measures of memory. No
differences were found between groups in the total number of items recalled on the
MFIT, and it is noted that the average scores for the two simulating groups (13.2 and
13.3, respectively) were well above the suggested cutoff. Bernard contended that this
finding might have resulted from the placement of the MFIT at the end of a battery
that contained more difficult tests, thus making the intent of the measure more
obvious. He suggested the MFIT be placed at the beginning of test batteries to avoid
compromising the test’s detection ability. This contention was confirmed in a
subsequent study by Bernard, Houston, and Natoli (1993). By placing the MFIT at the
beginning of the battery, it was found that a group of college students simulating
memory impairment recalled significantly fewer items than a group of controls.
Although the authors noted the average number of items recalled by the simulated
malingerers (M=10.0) remained above the suggested cutoff, an inspection of the tables
reveals this group did recall fewer correct rows (M=2.2) than the recommended 3-row
cutoff.
Schretlen, Brandt, Kraft, and Van Gorp (1991) conducted a more extensive
study using two groups of simulators. In the first group, community volunteers and
college students were instructed to feign either psychogenic amnesia, amnesia due to
head trauma, or amnesia of unspecified etiology. The second simulating group was
14

composed of inpatients with substance abuse problems given instructions to feign
“insanity.” The performance of simulators was compared to that of 80 normal
controls and a variety of patients including 10 amnesics with “severe” memory
problems, 55 patients with a history of “moderately severe” traumatic brain injury
(TBI), 9 patients with dementia (primarily Huntington’s disease), 34 patients with
severe mental illness (i.e., schizophrenia), 40 patients with a variety of
neuropsychiatric diagnoses, and 7 civil litigants under suspicion of malingering
memory complaints. It was found that the genuine amnesics, severe psychiatric
patients, and individuals suspected of malingering recalled significantly fewer items
than individuals simulating amnesia. No differences were found between normal
controls, patients with TBI, and normals simulating amnesia, although the patients
simulating insanity were found to recall significantly fewer items than the normal
controls. None of the simulators fell below the 9-item cutoff.
Using the 9-item cutoff, a sensitivity of 0% was found for the normals
simulating various forms of amnesia and 36% for patients simulating insanity.
Comparatively, the sensitivity for the group suspected of malingering was 43%.
While it is possible the performance of the two simulating groups was affected by the
failure of the experimenters to provide detailed scenarios, this finding does bring into
question the effects of simulating different conditions as well as the validity of using
college students in simulation studies.
In terms of specificity, Schretlen et al. (1991) found that 73% of all patients
combined fell above the 9-item cutoff. From this and the comparatively lower
performance of the amnesics, the authors concluded that the MFIT lacked adequate
specificity and was overly sensitive to genuine memory impairment. However, the
15

use of groups of widely disparate sizes (some with very low Ns) and failure to make
statistical corrections for experiment wide error (i.e., comparisons between 9 groups
using three dependent measures) violates statistical assumptions and brings into
question the validity of these findings.
A simulation design study by Guilmette, Hart, Giuliano, and Leininger (1994)
examined the efficacy of the MFIT in relation to an abbreviated version of the Hiscock
Forced-Choice Procedure (A-HFCP). Participants included 20 inpatients in a brain
injury rehabilitation hospital, 20 psychiatric inpatients with a predominant diagnosis of
Major Depression, and 20 college students instructed to “fake believable memory
deficits.” Guilmette et al. found that the brain-injured subjects recalled significantly
fewer items on the MFIT than both the simulated malingerers and psychiatric patients.
Furthermore, 45% of the brain-injured subjects fell below the 9-item cutoff, as
compared to only 15% of the simulated malingerers. In contrast, none of the braininjured subjects and only 5% of the psychiatric patients were misclassified on the AHFCP, and 85% of the simulated malingerers were correctly detected. While these
results appear dismal for the MFIT, it is noted the brain-injured subjects consisted
primarily of individuals who suffered from cerebrovascular accidents or head injuries,
and who demonstrated moderate to severe cognitive deficits on a variety of
neuropsychological tests (including memory). This is an important point to consider,
given the claims of Lezak (1976).
Using an expanded scoring system incorporating both quantitative and
qualitative methods, Arnett et al. (1995) conducted a two-part study comparing the
performance of simulators (college students) with that of neurological patients on the
MFIT. In the first phase, the performance of undergraduates was compared to a mixed
16

neurological sample consisting primarily of closed head injury with intracerebral
hemorrhage, cerebrovascular accident, and brain tumor cases (M time since injury =
1.67 years). It was found that undergraduate simulators recalled significantly fewer
correct rows in proper sequence, correct rows in any sequence, and total items in the
correct location than neurological patients. However, there was no difference between
simulators and patients in term of the number of correct items regardless of location
(which is the common scoring method), and it is noted the average number of items
recalled by the simulators was 12.1 (SD=2.6). Using the 9-item cutoff, sensitivity was
found to be 63% and specificity 74%; these numbers changed minimally when using
8- and 7-item cutoffs. Arnett et al. concluded from this phase of the study that less
than two correct rows in proper location be used as the cutoff, as this yielded an
improved specificity of 97% (sensitivity = 47%).
The second phase of the Arnett et al. (1995) study was an attempt to replicate
the findings of the first phase using a similar group of neurological patients and “more
sophisticated” simulators (i.e., medical students). The same pattern of results
emerged, and using the 9-item cutoff a similar rate of sensitivity and specificity was
found (76% and 80%, respectively). The authors concluded the number of correct
rows in proper location was the best discriminator, as only two neurological patients in
the entire sample were misidentified.
Although the Arnett et al. (1995) study was beneficial in providing evidence
that individuals with traumatic brain injury can perform adequately on the MFIT,
certain limitations are worth noting. First, simulators were only instructed to
exaggerate problems with brain damage, rather than specifically feign memory
impairment. This may account for the findings of low sensitivity when using the
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recommended cutoff. Moreover, simulators were tested in a group format and using
only the MFIT, which the authors acknowledged may have affected the results.
Second, the authors noted that four of the neurological subjects were not fully oriented
to person, place, and time. While this may be indicative of significant cognitive
impairment, no specific mention is made to their performance on the MFIT, thus their
potential contribution to lowered specificity. Furthermore, the authors mentioned that
all patients received a full neuropsychological battery, yet failed to report on the level
of performance of this group. As such, it is unknown what the actual level of
functioning was for this group (except that they all had IQ’s above 70), which limits
the conclusions to be drawn from this study regarding neurological impairment and
MFIT performance.
Two major findings have emerged from simulation design studies of the MFIT.
First, nearly all of these studies used samples of college students to simulate the
performance of malingerers. While an advantage in this procedure is increased
experimental control, it comes at the expense of external validity. Rogers et al. (1993)
noted that it is unknown as to what extent the performance of these groups generalizes
to that of malingerers in real-world settings. As Rogers and Cruise (1998)
discovered, factors such as appreciation for negative incentives (i.e., consequences for
unsuccessful feigning), ability to identify with the scenario, and relevance to
participants can affect response styles. Given that these factors are often not
incorporated into simulation studies, the validity of findings from these studies is
questionable. This may explain the widely discrepant findings of sensitivity among
these studies, i.e., 0% in Schretlen et al. (1991) to 76% in Arnett et al. (1995). Other
noted confounds include variations in the amount of detail provided in scenarios,
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disorders participants were instructed to feign (i.e., memory deficits vs. insanity),
administration format (i.e., group vs. individual, beginning vs. end of test battery), and
educational differences between simulators and patient controls. As such, estimates of
sensitivity derived from simulation studies should be considered cautiously.
The second major finding from simulation studies of the MFIT comes in the
form of additional normative data. Specifically, these studies provided further
evidence that individuals with established neurological and psychiatric conditions
resulting in severe cognitive impairment have greater difficulty in “passing” the MFIT
than those individuals with less severe impairments. In keeping with Lezak’s (1976)
claim regarding “significantly deteriorated” individuals, the findings of low specificity
among such populations is not unexpected. It could therefore be argued that it would
be more appropriate to examine the specificity for such populations separate from that
of individuals with less severe deficits, as these are the individuals malingerers are
most likely to imitate (e.g., Greiffenstein et al., 1996; Iverson, 1995).
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Differential Prevalence Designs
There have only been two studies examining performance on the MFIT using a
differential prevalence design. The first of these was conducted by Lee, Loring, and
Martin (1992), who compared the MFIT performance of 100 inpatients with temporal
lobe epilepsy (TLE), 40 outpatients with neurological disorders not involved in
litigation, and 16 individuals with neurological disorders involved in litigation. TLE
patients had demonstrated memory impairment (less than 5th percentile) on at least
one of four standardized memory tests, and were not involved in litigation. The nonlitigating outpatient sample was comprised of a variety of neurological disorders (e.g.,
tumor, closed head injury), whereas the outpatients involved in litigation were
predominately cases of mild closed head injury. Analyses revealed no differences in
the total number of MFIT items recalled between TLE patients and non-litigating
outpatients. However, both groups were found to recall significantly more items than
the litigating outpatient group. Lee et al. recommended using a cutoff of seven or
fewer items, as this yielded the best overall sensitivity and specificity.
A closer inspection of the Lee et al. (1992) study reveals a problem with the
reported sensitivity and specificity. Instead of reporting values for a 9-item cutoff, the
authors report values for an 8-item cutoff. In examining the data provided in their
tables, use of the 9-item cutoff would produce a specificity of 93% for both the TLE
and non-litigating outpatient groups, compared to a sensitivity of 32.5% for the
litigating outpatients. Specificity changed minimally when using the recommended 7item cutoff (i.e., 96% for TLE, 95% for non-litigating outpatients), and there was no
change in sensitivity for the litigating outpatients. This small amount of change hardly
warrants a recommendation for changing cutoff scores. Moreover, a cutoff of six
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items would have been even more accurate, as no patient in their study obtained a
score below 7 items. Nonetheless, the finding of high levels of specificity are
encouraging, as Lee et al. noted the TLE patients with impaired memory were selected
on the basis that their pathology almost always affects structures underlying new
learning. Thus, there is evidence from a large sample that individuals with memory
impairment can perform quite well on the MFIT.
In the other study using a differential prevalence design (Griffin, Normington,
& Glassmire, 1996), the authors compared two groups with “no incentive” to malinger
(i.e., permanently psychiatrically disabled individuals and “normals” from community
programs) with a group of “possible malingerers” (i.e., individuals filing
psychological disability claims). It was found that 19.8% of the possible malingerers
fell below the 9-item cutoff, as compared to only 9.4% of the normals. Problematic
was the finding that a higher percentage of the permanently disabled group (28.3%)
fell below the recommended cutoff.
Rogers et al. (1993) noted an intrinsic problem with differential prevalence
designs is the assumption that the context of the evaluation results in dissimilar rates
of feigning (i.e., individuals in litigation are more likely to be malingering). It is
virtually impossible to identify true prevalence rates for malingering from these
designs, given no other objective criteria for malingering are used. Moreover, these
studies often overlook the possibility that individuals with “no incentive” for
malingering based on a given criterion (e.g., non-litigating status) do not have other
incentives for malingering (e.g., avoidance of responsibility) (Greiffenstein et al.,
1994). This is best exemplified when the results of the Lee et al. (1992) study are
compared with those of Arnett et al. (1995). Specifically, Arnett et al. examined the
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MFIT performance of their neurological patient group with respect to the patients’
litigation status. No significant differences were found on any of the MFIT indices
under investigation between patients in litigation and those not in litigation; moreover,
the authors noted there was a trend for the patients in litigation to actually perform
better. This stands in contrast to the inferior performance of the litigating outpatients
in the Lee et al. study, from which it can be concluded that estimates of sensitivity
from differential prevalence studies are quite variable and potentially unreliable.
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Known-Groups Designs
To date, five studies have examined the MFIT using a known-groups design.
In an effort to improve upon previous designs, Greiffenstein et al. (1994) devised
objective criteria (i.e., improbable outcomes for mild head injury) for identifying a
group of individuals with persistent postconcussive syndrome (PPCS) with high
likelihood of malingering. Criteria included improbable poor performance (> -3 SD)
on two or more neuropsychological measures, contradiction between collateral sources
and symptom history, total disability in a major social role after one year, and claims
of remote memory loss. Mildly head injured PPCS patients who met two or more of
these criteria were classified as probable malingerers (N=43). Their performance was
compared to that of 33 neuropsychological referrals with severe TBI (i.e., comatose
admission status with medical instability), and 30 referrals with mild head injury and
PPCS but no objective malingering markers. Comparisons were made across several
measures of memory, including the MFIT. It was found that the probable malingerers
recalled significantly fewer correct items on the MFIT than both the severe TBI and
mild head injury with PPCS groups.
With regard to sensitivity and specificity, 62% of probable malingerers were
correctly classified using a cutoff of nine items, whereas a specificity of 88% was
found for TBI patients and 93% for PPCS patients. Although the sensitivity of 62%
was not significantly greater than Greiffenstein et al.’s (1994) estimated base rate of
59% for probable malingering, they noted that this estimate may have been inflated
due to referral source bias (i.e., majority of the mild head injury clients were referrals
from insurance companies and attorneys). As such, the authors stated a more
reasonable estimate of base rates for malingering among PPCS clients lies in the range
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of 33 to 60%. Whereas the findings of specificity are encouraging, all of the cases
studied were “a number of years” postinjury, which limits the generalizations one can
draw to more acute cases.
Based upon the findings that criminal defendants often claim amnesia to either
prove incompetence or escape criminal responsibility, Simon (1994) conducted an
examination of the MFIT among non-retarded forensic inpatients. The experimental
group was comprised of 14 male pretrial defendants who had been given a diagnosis
of malingering by the staffing team, using a wide range of information sources
(excluding the MFIT) and in accordance with DSM-III-R criteria (APA, 1987). The
performance of this group was compared to a control group of 14 forensic inpatients
with serious mental illness. All of the control subjects had been legally declared “Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity” (NGBRI), and thus were assumed to have no incentive
to malinger. Using the recommended 9-item cutoff, it was found that 85.7% of both
groups were correctly classified. Using the recommended 3-row cutoff, sensitivity
increased to 100%, although this came at the expense of reducing specificity to an
unacceptable 43%.
Aside from the relatively small number of subjects studied, Simon (1994)
noted some factors that may have affected his findings. First, it was noted that all of
the suspected malingerers were rather extreme in their presentations. Thus, lower
rates of sensitivity would be expected among more sophisticated malingerers and
those attempting to feign more subtle deficits. Second, the control group consisted of
patients with chronic psychosis and/or dementia. Although the average IQ for controls
was 90, it was still significantly correlated with the total number of items recalled
(r=.72). Thus, lower specificity is not unexpected when one takes into consideration
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the demonstrated combined effects of psychiatric illness and intellectual functioning
on MFIT performance (Hays et al., 1993). This was further demonstrated in a knowngroups investigation by Hayes, Hale, and Gouvier (1997), who found that nonmalingering mentally retarded forensic inpatients performed worse than mentally
retarded pretrial defendants diagnosed with malingering across several standard
malingering measures (including the MFIT).
Millis and Kler (1995) used below chance performance on a forced-choice
symptom validity test (Recognition Word Memory Test [RMT]; Warrington, 1984) to
identify a group of “clinical malingerers” from among a sample of individuals
reporting closed head injuries and pursuing compensatory litigation. The MFIT
performance of this group (N=7) was compared to that of seven inpatients with TBI in
the acute phase of recovery (mean time post-injury of 1.1 months). It was found that
the malingering group recalled significantly fewer total items (M=8.0) than the TBI
group (M=12.1). Millis and Kler further reported a sensitivity of 57% and specificity
of 100% when using the 7-item cutoff recommended by Lee et al. (1992). They
advised against using the 9-item cutoff, as specificity dropped to 71%.
A re-examination of the data supplied by Millis and Kler (1995) reveals these
estimates of sensitivity and specificity to be in error. Apparently, they considered the
9-item cutoff to mean nine or fewer items recalled, when in fact it was intended to
mean less than nine items. As such, use of the 9-item cutoff continued to yield a
specificity of 100%, as all TBI patients recalled nine or more items. This is an
encouraging finding, as this group was reported to have sustained moderate to severe
injuries (i.e., Glasgow Coma Scales at time of injury between 13 and 3). Even more
encouraging is the fact that only two of the clinical malingerers recalled nine or more
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items, which places sensitivity at 71%. However, the fact that all of the clinical
malingerers were selected on the basis of below chance performance on another
measure makes it highly probable they were rather blatant in their deception strategies.
Also, the restricted size of the sample makes it difficult to generalize these findings.
In a follow up to their 1994 study, Greiffenstein, Baker, and Gola (1996)
examined alternative scoring methods for the MFIT using an expanded sample of TBI
patients (N=60) and probable malingerers (N=90). Using a more conservative 10-item
cutoff (fewer than 10 items recalled) derived through discriminant function analysis,
sensitivity for the possible malingering group was found to be 64%, comparable to the
rate of 62% found using the 9-item cutoff in the 1994 study. Unfortunately,
specificity dropped from 88% to 72% for the TBI group when using the raised cutoff.
The authors surmised that inclusion of TBI patients with dense amnesia (N=5) was
inappropriate, as there was no practical clinical basis for giving this measure to
individuals with objective severe neurological disease, and that malingering is not
typically an issue with these patients. Removing these cases from the analyses,
specificity with the 10-item cutoff increased to 78%. Given that sensitivity did not
change between these studies whereas specificity was adversely affected, it stands to
be argued that the 9-item cutoff be maintained, with malingering suspected whenever
8 or fewer items are recalled.
In summary, the known-groups investigations of the MFIT offer more
promising results regarding the instrument’s discriminatory power than both
simulation and differential prevalence studies. This is relevant, given the limitations
and questionable validity of the latter designs mentioned by Rogers et al. (1993).
While the results from these investigations are believed to be more generalizable to
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real-world samples, a limitation remains the lack of reliable and uncontaminated
criteria for identifying malingerers, although the Greiffenstein et al. studies were
designed to address this issue. Another problem concerns the fact that the findings
reported here are primarily applicable to individuals seeking civil litigation (i.e.,
disability and/or compensation claims secondary to mild head injury). Only two
studies have investigated the MFIT among pretrial criminal defendants (Hayes et al.,
1997; Simon, 1994), and three of these studies (Hayes et al., 1997; Millis & Kler,
1995; Simon, 1994) were restricted in their sample sizes. The latter two studies also
had an increased likelihood the diagnosed malingerers were rather blatant in their
deception strategies. As a consequence, generalizations based upon these findings are
necessarily limited. There remains a need for replication with larger samples, in
particular criminal defendants, and including those who are less blatant in their efforts
to feign mental disorders or cognitive impairment.
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Summary of Findings
This review provides evidence the MFIT has adequate specificity among a
variety of populations. Five studies provided data from which estimates of specificity
could be established for psychiatric patients, from which the following can be
concluded. Specificity tends to be high for non-retarded acutely ill psychiatric
inpatients (e.g., Goldberg & Miller, 1986, 100%; Guilmette et al., 1994, 90%) and
non-retarded individuals with chronic forms of psychosis (combined data from Back et
al., 1996, and Simon, 1994, 87%). Combining these data with the data from Hays et
al. (1993), the overall specificity for non-retarded psychiatric patients is 83.8% (268 of
320 patients correctly identified). Although Back et al. found MFIT performance to
be unaffected by symptom severity and mental status, Schretlen et al. (1991) reported
very poor performance for their “severe psychiatric” group. It should be noted that
“severe” was never defined in the later study, although scores on the Mini-Mental
State Examination were highly correlated (r=.81) with MFIT items recalled for the
combined groups of neurological and psychiatric patients.
A much lower specificity of 62.5% was found for individuals with a diagnosis
of mild to moderate mental retardation (Goldberg & Miller, 1986), and even lower
rates (32.4%) among psychiatric inpatients with intellectual functioning in the
moderate to mild mental retardation range (Hays et al., 1993). While the majority of
patients studied suffered from some form of psychosis or depression, a setback in
these studies was failure to adequately specify the diagnostic makeup of the sample
and provide symptom severity ratings (e.g., Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Hays et al.,
1993; Schretlen et al., 1991). This limits the conclusions that can be reached
regarding particular diagnostic groups, although the evidence suggests that individuals
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with a psychiatric diagnosis other than mental retardation can perform adequately on
the MFIT.
For neurological conditions, individuals having suffered intracerebral
hemorrhage or injuries resulting in severe global cognitive impairment or severe
organic amnesia had the poorest recall on the MFIT (Greiffenstein et al., 1996;
Guilmette et al., 1994; Morgan, 1991; Schretlen et al., 1991). Otherwise, specificity
was adequate independent of whether the nature of the insult was diffuse or specific
(Bernard & Fowler, 1988; Lee et al., 1992), or whether the individual was in the acute
or late phase of recovery (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995). Specificity
estimates for these populations ranged from 74 to 100%, and of the studies reviewed,
six provided data from which an overall specificity could be computed (Arnett et al.,
1995; Bernard & Fowler, 1988; Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1992; Millis &
Kler, 1995; Morgan, 1991). From these studies, a cutoff of nine items correctly
recalled resulted in a specificity of 85.8% (266 of 310 patients) for individuals with
neurological conditions, most of whom were experiencing significant problems with
memory.
Less encouraging are the findings of sensitivity for the MFIT. When
examining data from simulation studies, the MFIT was found to have inadequate
sensitivity. Three studies provided sufficient information from which an overall
estimate of sensitivity could be calculated (Arnett et al., 1995; Guilmette et al., 1994;
Schretlen et al., 1991). From these studies, 53 out of 141 total simulators failed to
recall nine or more items, which yields an overall sensitivity of 37.5%. Even lower
figures were obtained when the results of the two differential prevalence designs were
combined (Griffin et al., 1996; Lee et al., 1992). Of the 107 individuals suspected of
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malingering in these two studies, 24 failed using the 9-item cutoff, resulting in a
dismal sensitivity of 22.4%. As noted, the validity of these designs and the
generalization of the findings is questionable. This is evident in the much higher rates
of sensitivity found in the studies using diagnosed malingerers. Examining the
combined data from these studies (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995;
Simon, 1994), 44 out of 64 individuals diagnosed as malingering through independent
means were correctly identified through their performance on the MFIT, producing a
more encouraging sensitivity of 68.8%. For civil litigants seeking disability and/or
financial compensation for their injuries, the overall sensitivity was 64%; for forensic
evaluatees, 85.7%.
Using data from the known-groups studies, the 9-item cutoff for the MFIT
appears to be a valid indicator of malingering among civil litigants/disability claimants
(.64/.36 > .14/.86). It is also an effective indicator, whether one uses more liberal
(i.e., 60 to 66%) or conservative (15 to 33%) estimates of malingering base rates (e.g.,
1 - .66 > .122 + .05; .33 > .122 + .05). The small combined error rate (17.2%) results
in a rather broad base rate effectiveness range (i.e., effective when the base rate falls
between 18 to 82%). Based on this data, the MFIT is both valid and effective over a
broad range in distinguishing between individuals malingering memory problems from
those with memory problems due to neurological causes.
Only one study has provided information from which validity and
effectiveness can be determined for criminal defendants (Simon, 1994). Using the
data from this study and the findings from both non-retarded and retarded psychiatric
patients (as these are the groups criminal defendants are most likely to attempt
simulating; Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986), the MFIT appears to be a valid indicator for
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malingering memory problems secondary to psychiatric illness (.857/.143 > .162/.838)
and psychiatric illness plus mental retardation (.857/.143 > .676/.324). Given an
estimated 16 to 20% malingering base rate among criminal defendants, the MFIT
appears to be effective at identifying malingerers among non-retarded psychiatric
inpatients (combined error rate of 16.2%), but not among psychiatric patients with
mental retardation (combined error rate of 59%). However, definite conclusions
cannot be made in this regard, as false negative estimates were derived from a single
study with only 14 malingerers, all of which were noted to be extreme in their
presentations. Further research with this population is clearly indicated to determine
the effectiveness of the MFIT.
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Qualitative Scoring
Using the recommended quantitative scoring system, a minimum 10% of both
neurological and psychiatric patients would be incorrectly suspected of malingering
memory complaints. In cases involving a dual diagnosis of psychosis and mental
retardation, the rates may be greater than 64%. Although it would be inappropriate to
establish a diagnosis of malingering on the basis of a single screening measure and in
the absence of other objective data, important ramifications can still result. For
example, one may be subjected to more extensive testing, stigmatized with a label and
suffer loss of reputation, lose deserved financial compensation, or even face an
undeserved prison sentence. Thus, modifications that can increase specificity and
improve effectiveness warrant investigation.
One method has been lowering the cutoff for the MFIT. On the basis of their
respective findings, several investigations (e.g., Guilmette et al., 1994; Lee et al.,
1992) have recommended using lower cutoffs either for the total number of items or
the total number of rows recalled. However, it was noted these alternate cutoffs were
found to either result in minimal changes in specificity, or were erroneously based
upon miscalculations of the data. More importantly, they resulted in decreasing the
sensitivity of the MFIT (i.e., Greiffenstein et al., 1996). Thus, what is needed is a
method that increases specificity while either maintaining or even improving
sensitivity. One potential method advocated by Rogers et al. (1993) is the “magnitude
of errors” strategy. This method simply involves examining the differences in
patterns of incorrect responses between either simulators or known malingerers and
relevant clinical comparison groups. This can be accomplished through examining the
qualitative rather than quantitative errors on the MFIT.
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The examination of qualitative errors is not new to neuropsychology. In 1961,
Benton and Spreen examined the differences in qualitative errors between normals
simulating brain damage and actual head injured patients on the Benton Visual
Retention Test. It was found that simulators made more errors of distortion of recalled
designs (i.e., bizarre figures) while making fewer perseverative and omission errors
than actual brain damaged subjects. Interestingly, it was observed in the first
normative study of the MFIT (Goldberg & Miller, 1986) that mentally retarded
patients were more prone to making errors involving perseveration and reversal,
whereas psychiatric patients typically omitted a single row. Although the authors
failed to provide scoring criteria for qualitative errors, they suggested these error types
be scrutinized to avoid false positives.
Several of the studies mentioned have examined qualitative errors in some
fashion. Only one type of qualitative error (i.e., repeated items) was examined by
Schretlen et al. (1991). While no significant differences were found between any
groups on this type of error, it was significantly correlated with IQ (r=-.29), a finding
consistent with that of Goldberg and Miller (1986). Morgan (1991) found the majority
(40%) of his neurological sample made the error of misordering geometric shapes
(actually, 65% of those able to recall the shapes). Errors of perseveration (repetition)
were also common, while less common errors involved repeating rows or continuing
rows (e.g., extending letters from A to E). It was further noted that 93% of the sample
recalled all of the capital letters and 83% recalled all Arabic numerals, thus providing
evidence for a primacy effect in recall. Morgan therefore suggested that failure to
recall these two rows should raise the suspicion of malingering, as these were cases of
true memory impairment and 75% of those who failed the MFIT still recalled the
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capital letters. Interestingly, one would expect better recall of items from the last two
rows, given the findings of a recency effect in the short-term recall of amnesiacs
(Wiggins & Brandt, 1988). This unexpected pattern of performance may be
attributable to a combination of short exposure time (10 seconds) and impaired
processing speed.
In the simulation study of Guilmette et al. (1994) it was briefly mentioned that
some of the simulators added additional items in their recall, which led the authors to
suggest that a qualitative analysis may improve sensitivity for the MFIT. Conversely,
no differences were found between simulators and neurological patients on any of the
14 qualitative indices examined in the two simulation studies of Arnett et al. (1995).
Hypothesizing that qualitative errors would be less related to those factors shown to
affect specificity (i.e., age and intelligence), Griffin et al. (1996) administered the
MFIT to 90 undergraduate simulators to develop a new qualitative scoring system.
They identified 10 qualitative “malingering” errors, which were examined with their
groups of analog malingerers, psychiatrically disabled non-malingerers, and “normal”
(less severely ill) controls. The disabled group made significantly more “wrong item”
errors (i.e., production of recognizable figure not on stimulus card) than the control
group, and the control group made significantly more “Roman numeral” errors (i.e.,
tally marks drawn as Roman numerals) than the disabled group, which the authors
judged to be artifacts of illness. The analog malingerers were found to make more
dyslexic (i.e., character reversal), embellishment (i.e., elaboration or adornment of
recognizable character), gestalt (i.e., failure to make a 3 x5 arrangement when
recalling 15 items), and row sequence errors than the combined groups of disabled and
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controls. Moreover, it was found that analog malingerers produced significantly more
total qualitative errors than the non-malingering groups.
The hypothesis of Griffin et al. (1996) regarding the influence of age and
education was weakly supported, as age accounted for 4.1% of the variance in total
qualitative error scores for possible malingerers and IQ accounted for 4.1% of the
variance in qualitative errors for the non-malingering sample. However, there are
major limitations to these findings. The authors varied the MFIT instructions (i.e.,
added instructions to write down items “just as they appeared on the card”) in order to
produce more scorable errors. This goes against standard administration procedures,
and implies that under standard conditions few qualitative errors will be produced.
This is especially bothersome, given that Griffin et al. noted a low base rate for
qualitative errors (i.e., average analog malingerer made only one type of qualitative
error).
Finally, only one study using a known-groups design has investigated a
qualitative scoring method for the MFIT. In the Greiffenstein et al. (1996) study,
alternative scoring strategies were examined for the MFIT. While these were not
reported as qualitative methods per se, an inspection of their scoring criteria reveals
that one particular method (i.e., “spatial” scoring) would constitute a qualitative
method. Specifically, this score reflects a correct ordering of elements within rows,
similar to the “misordering” error of Morgan (1991). Interestingly, the use of spatial
scoring was found to result in improved rates of sensitivity (69%) and specificity
(82%). While this study did not investigate other types of qualitative errors, it does
provide preliminary evidence that qualitative methods may produce better results
when using a valid research design.
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In summary, there are indications that individuals with known organic
dysfunction and/or impaired cognitive functioning make specific types of qualitative
errors. These mainly include errors of perseveration and misordering of elements,
which is not unexpected given the nature of the underlying pathology (e.g., Malloy &
Richardson, 1994). Furthermore, one study (Morgan, 1991) found that individuals
with organically based memory problems exhibited a primacy effect in their MFIT
recall. Qualitative scoring may therefore prove useful in improving the detection
ability of the MFIT. However, several limitations preclude definite conclusions in this
matter. This includes a lack of uniformity in the types of errors examined across
studies, and the fact that no studies using a known-groups design have systematically
investigated the many identified types of qualitative errors. Thus, there remains a
need for more research in this area.
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The Present Study
There is evidence the MFIT has adequate sensitivity and specificity with a
variety of populations. However, a number of shortcomings have been identified,
including inadequate sample sizes, inappropriate inclusion of severely brain injured
patients, failure to make statistical corrections for multiple comparisons, failure to
include diagnostic information and symptom ratings for psychiatric patients, failure to
consider alternative incentives for and assessment of feigning/exaggerating complaints
among “non-malingering” subjects, miscalculations of data, and reliance upon study
designs of questionable ecological validity. Despite these shortcomings, the MFIT
appears to be a valid and effective screening measure for malingered memory
complaints within neuropsychological/civil forensic settings. There are also
indications that a qualitative scoring method may enhance the MFIT’s efficacy in this
regard, although no systematic investigation of this method using a sound research
design has been conducted.
One group for whom the MFIT may prove useful is pretrial criminal
defendants. These individuals often present with memory deficits relating either to the
crime itself or as part of a clinical picture in which cognitive deficits are an associated
feature (e.g., psychosis) to procure an insanity verdict or be seen as incompetent to
stand trial (Rubinsky & Brandt, 1986; Schacter, 1986a; 1986b). However, there has
only been one investigation to date examining the performance of this group with the
MFIT (Simon, 1994). While this study possessed ecological validity, conclusions
were limited due to the small sample size and use of subjects who were extreme in
their presentations. Interestingly, Rogers and Cruise (1998) have contended that
criminal defendants would be more likely to give extreme presentations, considering
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the negative consequences of a conviction and that extreme symptoms may be thought
to be necessary for acquiring an insanity verdict. While this has intuitive appeal and
offers encouragement that such individuals would be easily identified through their
performance on malingering measures, it does pose one major confound. The clinical
populations that criminal defendants may be attempting to mimic (individuals found
not guilty by reason of insanity) are often characterized by severe and chronic
psychosis and significant intellectual/cognitive deficits. The observation that these
populations have been noted to perform quite poorly on the MFIT (e.g., Hays et al.,
1993) poses a serious threat to the ability of the quantitative scoring system in
differentiating these groups. Thus, there remains a need for a known-groups
investigation of the MFIT using both a larger sample of criminal defendants and
relevant comparison group, and investigating alternative scoring strategies.
The present study extended upon previous investigations of the MFIT through
the following methods. First, this study examined both quantitative and qualitative
scoring methods for the MFIT using a known-groups design. The experimental group
consisted of an archival group of pretrial criminal defendants (forensic inpatients
judicially ruled as incompetent to stand trial) who were independently diagnosed as
malingering and given the MFIT under natural clinical conditions (i.e., as part of a
comprehensive psychological evaluation for malingering). In keeping with the
recommendations of Rogers and Cruise (1998), the performance of this group was
compared with that of two relevant clinical comparison groups (e.g., individuals with
similar criminal backgrounds and individuals with similar psychiatric symptoms).
These consisted of a second archival sample of pretrial (PT) forensic inpatients who
had not been suspected of malingering and also given the MFIT under normal
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conditions, and a current control sample of forensic inpatients found NGBRI by the
local state courts.
Second, this study extended upon previous research by verifying the presumed
“non-malingering” status of the NGBRI comparison group. This was done through
the administration of additional malingering screening measures (e.g., M-Test, Dot
Counting Test). Last, information pertaining to the MFIT’s sensitivity, specificity,
validity, and effectiveness was computed for both the quantitative and qualitative
scoring methods, both separately and combined.
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Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were offered: 1) Patients diagnosed as malingering
would recall fewer total items on the MFIT than non-malingering patients (PT and
NGBRI); 2) Since psychiatric patients often exhibit varying degrees of intellectual and
cognitive impairment, it was hypothesized the non-malingering patients would make
more qualitative errors involving perseveration, misordering of elements, and
character reversals and rotations than diagnosed malingerers; 3) Diagnosed
malingerers, in an attempt to portray themselves as insane, would make more
qualitative errors involving bizarre and unusual reproductions and addition of
extraneous elements than non-malingering patients; 4) Diagnosed malingerers were
expected to recall fewer items from the beginning of the MFIT (i.e., failure to show a
primacy effect) than the non-malingering patients (i.e., Morgan, 1991); and 5) Linear
discriminant analysis incorporating both quantitative and qualitative variables would
yield substantially better discriminating power than the total number of items recalled
alone.
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Methods
Participants
Three groups of patients were examined in the present study. The first group,
diagnosed malingerers (DM), consisted of an archival sample of 44 adult male
inpatients (pretrial criminal defendants) evaluated at a state forensic hospital between
the years 1991 and 2000. Individuals in this group had been judicially declared
incompetent to stand trial by the local courts and remanded for further evaluation and
treatment. These patients were identified by the interdisciplinary treatment team (i.e.,
psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, nurse, and security staff) as either feigning or
exaggerating problems with psychosis, cognitive dysfunction, or both. This was
accomplished on the basis of behavioral observations of inconsistent and/or atypical
symptom presentations (e.g., unable to do the simplest arithmetic yet observed playing
spades on the unit) and/or improbably poor performance on the initial mental status
and competency examinations. Patients in this group were subsequently referred for a
psychological evaluation and given the MFIT, along with other measures of
malingering, as part of a comprehensive battery. Based upon behavioral observations
and the combined results of assessment, these individuals were diagnosed as
malingering using the indices outlined in either the DSM-III-R or DSM-IV (APA,
1987; 1994). Although the results of psychological assessment were utilized in
reaching a final diagnostic decision in most cases, in none of these cases did the MFIT
contribute to the determination of the diagnosis of malingering.
For comparison, data was collected on a second archival patient group
consisting of 32 adult male pretrial criminal defendants (PT) also found incompetent
to stand trial and remanded for further evaluation and treatment during the same time
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period. Patients in this group were selected on the basis they had not been suspected
of or diagnosed as malingering and had also been administered the MFIT, although as
part of a more comprehensive psychological (i.e., diagnostic) or neuropsychological
assessment to check for level of effort. As with the DM group, the MFIT did not
contribute to the determination of PT patients’ non-malingering status.
According to Rogers and Cruise (1998), comparison groups in malingering
research should be relevant to forensic evaluations in terms of having a representative
range of mental disorders and criminal backgrounds. Although the PT group would
appear to meet this criteria, that they were not suspected of or diagnosed as
malingering does not rule out the possibility that some patients in this group were in
fact malingering. Data was therefore collected on a third and current group of 30 adult
male forensic inpatients who had been judicially declared NGBRI by the courts and
remanded to the same state forensic hospital for continued care and treatment. This
group was selected for purposes of comparison because: 1) They have a
representative range of mental disorders and criminal backgrounds; 2) They have a
higher incentive for “faking good” for purpose of release, and thus are considered less
likely to be “faking bad;” 3) They are a highly relevant comparison group in that the
NGBRI status is the typical goal of pretrial malingerers.
Materials
Rey 15-Item Visual Memory Test. The Rey 15-Item Visual Memory Test
(MFIT; Lezak, 1976; Rey, 1964) was developed as a screening measure for
malingered memory impairment. It consists of 15 items, arranged in three rows and
five columns, which are printed on an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper. The respondent is
told they will be shown a card that has 15 different (emphasized) symbols on it. They
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are further informed they will have 10 seconds to view the card, after which time the
card will be taken away and they will be asked to draw everything they can remember.
The traditional quantitative scoring method involves simply counting the total number
of items correctly recalled, with scores of less than nine items recalled used in raising
the suspicion of malingering.
For the present study, MFIT protocols for all participants were scored in terms
of the number of correct items recalled and along the various qualitative dimensions
identified through previous investigations. These qualitative errors were defined to
the fullest extent possible based upon the descriptions provided in the respective
studies.
Negative Impression Management Scale. The Negative Impression
Management (NIM) scale of the Personality Assessment Inventory (Morey, 1991) was
used to screen for the exaggeration of psychopathology among the NGBRI
participants (Appendix B). It consists of nine items, selected on the basis of very low
endorsement rates, which represent an exaggerated unfavorable self-impression or
extremely bizarre and unlikely symptoms (e.g., “I have visions in which I see myself
forced to commit crimes”) (Morey, 1996). Items are rated by the respondent on a 4point scale, ranging from 0 ‘false, not at all true’ to 3 ‘very true’ which are then
summed to obtain a total raw score (possible range of 0 to 27). The PAI was
standardized with large clinical, normal census-matched, and college student samples
(N>1,000 each). Overall, good psychometric properties were reported by Morey
(1991). The median Cronbach’s alpha across the 22 full scales was above .80 for the
entire normative sample, with an average 3-week test-retest reliability of .78 for a
combined sample of college students and community volunteers.
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For the NIM scale, an alpha of .74 was reported for the normative clinical
sample and a 3-week test-retest reliability of .75 for the combined normal sample.
Morey (1991) suggested that a raw score of 13 or more be used as a cutoff, as scores
in this range were more than 2 standard deviations above the mean for the clinical
sample. He reported on a simulation study which revealed that use of this cutoff
resulted in correct classification of 86.5% of college student simulators, while only
5.9% of a clinical sample and 1.5% of a normal sample were misclassified. Also, a
known-groups study by Rogers, Sewell, Cruise, Wang, and Ustad (1998) revealed that
NIM scores above 13 were a useful screen for identifying criminal forensic
malingerers. Morey (1996) provides further clinical interpretations for T-score ranges,
as well as a summary of additional simulation design investigations of the scale. In
the present study, a raw score of 13 or more was used as the cutoff for possible
malingering.
M-Test. The M-Test (Beaber et al., 1985) was also used to assess the
possibility of feigning or exaggeration of psychiatric symptoms among the NGBRI
participants. The M-Test was developed as a screening measure to specifically detect
the malingering of schizophrenic symptoms. It consists of 33 true-false items, divided
into three scales. The C (Confusion) scale contains eight “attitude-belief” items, none
of which involve symptom endorsement, and which subjects are expected to endorse
in a fixed direction (e.g., “I believe that cancer is a horrible disease” should be
answered true). These items are used to assess comprehension, and are placed at the
beginning of the test. The body of the test contains randomly ordered items from the
M (Malingering) and S (Schizophrenia) scales. The M scale items reflect atypical and
extremely severe symptoms not characteristic of mental illness (e.g., “I believe that
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God has appointed me to teach the Zolan beliefs to all people that I meet”), whereas S
scale items are genuine symptoms associated with schizophrenia (e.g., “Periodically I
am bothered by hearing voices that no one else hears”). Using a sample of
schizophrenia patients and undergraduate simulators, a score of 4 or more positively
endorsed M scale items was identified as the cutoff for suspected malingering in the
pilot study of Beaber et al. (1985).
In a review of studies using the M-Test, Smith (1997) noted that simulation
studies provided encouraging estimates of sensitivity and specificity, whereas studies
with suspected malingerers yielded more variable results. In an effort to improve the
utility of this instrument, Rogers, Bagby, and Gillis (1992) developed “Rule-Out” and
“Rule-In” criteria for the M-Test using those items with the highest positive and
negative predictive power as determined through a known-groups investigation. Two
options were provided, one that was more conservative and maximized specificity
(Option A) and one which maximized sensitivity (Option B). Both the original and
revised scoring criteria were applied to the M-Test data for the NGBRI group, as well
as those archival patients who received the measure.
Dot Counting Test. The Dot Counting Test (DCT) is another screening
measure for malingering developed by Andre Rey (Lezak, 1995; Rey, 1941). It
consists of 12 cards on which are printed a series of dots. The first 6 cards contain sets
of ungrouped dots, whereas the last 6 cards contain sets of grouped dots. Respondents
are presented with the cards in a fixed non-sequential order, and instructed to count the
number of dots as quickly as possible. It is expected the non-malingering patient will
take longer to count the ungrouped dots than the grouped dots, with increases in
counting time proportional to increases in the number of dots. Binks, Gouvier, and
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Waters (1997) found the total number of incorrect responses for both grouped and
ungrouped dots provided better discrimination than five other indices derived from
DCT protocols between college student simulators and a heterogeneous sample of
patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation. For the present study, the cutoff
for suspected malingering was established as either the total grouped counting time
exceeding the total ungrouped counting time, or the total number of errors (grouped
plus ungrouped) greater than one standard deviation above the mean of the patient
sample of Binks et al. (1997) (i.e., more than 4 errors).
Expanded Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale. The Expanded Brief Psychiatric
Rating Scale, Version 4.0 (BPRS-E; Ventura et al., 1993) was used to obtain current
(2-week) ratings of psychiatric symptoms for the NGBRI participants (see Appendix
C). The BPRS-E is used to assess 24 separate dimensions of psychiatric symptoms
(e.g., hallucinatory behavior, flat affect). Each dimension is rated on a behaviorally
anchored 7-point Likert scale, with ratings ranging from 1 ‘not present’ to 7
‘extremely severe.’ NGBRI participants were assessed by doctoral students trained to
a minimum intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of .80 according to University of
Chicago Center for Psychiatric Rehabilitation criterion ratings. Ratings were based
upon a combination of behavioral observations and participants’ answers to standard
questions posed in an interview format.
Shipley Institute of Living Scale. The Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS;
Zachary, 1991) was used to provide an estimate of the general intellectual functioning
of NGBRI participants. The SILS has been widely used in a variety of settings with
both adolescents and adults to provide a brief measure of verbal intellectual ability. It
consists of a Vocabulary subtest containing 40 items assessing verbal skills, and an
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Abstraction subtest containing 20 items which assess abstract thinking skills. Agebased norms are provided from which the estimated WAIS-R Full Scale IQ can be
computed from the total score. Since the SILS’ inception in the 1930’s, additional
norms have been collected for a large (N=290) sample of mixed psychiatric patients.
Furthermore, Zachary reported on two studies which found a correlation of .85
between SILS estimated IQ and actual WAIS-R IQ’s for adult psychiatric patients.
Procedures
The present study was reviewed and approval granted by the Institutional
Review Boards of Louisiana State University, the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals, and the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System Forensic Division. The
hospital charts of all patients (both archival and current) were then thoroughly
reviewed for the following sources of information and entered onto a demographics
form (Appendix D). First, demographic information of theoretical relevance to MFIT
performance (age at the time of testing, years of education, and any available IQ
scores) were collected. Second, information for determining the groups was collected.
This included the number of prior arrests, commitment charge(s), and maximum
possible prison sentence as outlined in West’s (1998) Louisiana State statutes. Last,
information useful for verifying patients’ malingering status was gathered (i.e.,
psychiatric diagnoses, prior suspicion or diagnosis of malingering, documented
behavioral observations of staff, reasons for testing referral, results of any competency
and malingering assessments), as was other potentially relevant data (i.e., medication
status, documented history of neurological injury, number of previous hospitalizations
for psychosis, documented history of mental retardation).
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Selection Procedures for the DM and PT Groups. The selection criteria for
inclusion in the archival DM group included 1) pretrial legal status at the time of
evaluation 2) a diagnosis of malingering by the interdisciplinary treatment team, and
3) having been administered the MFIT, with a copy of the patient’s reproduction
available for re-scoring. The same criteria were used in selecting archival PT subjects,
with the noted exception that malingering had been definitely ruled out by the
treatment team.
Selection Procedures for NGBRI Participants. Potential participants in the
NGBRI group were screened by a clinician independent of the study for the presence
of factors that could impair ability to provide informed consent (e.g., severe
disorganization or intellectual impairment). Patients who were determined to be
suitable for the study and capable of giving consent, and for whom there were no
current or past indicators or diagnoses of malingering (as determined through chart
review) were approached for participation and had read to them the study consent
form (Appendix E). Participants’ level of understanding was then assessed through
having them paraphrase major points and answering questions quizzing their
understanding of the consent form. As outlined by Simon (1994), to reduce the
likelihood of confusion and possible malingering among NGBRI participants they
were further informed that they were no longer facing legal charges and their results
would not be shared with the courts or hospital staff.
NGBRI participants were subsequently administered the MFIT and SILS and
were rated on the BPRS-E. As previously mentioned, patients of NGBRI status are
considered to have less incentive to malinger impairment and more incentive to look
good for purposes of less restrictive placement (Hayes, Hale, & Gouvier, 1998).
48

While this is a reasonable assumption, it fails to take into account other incentives for
malingering (e.g., acquiring a single room, gaining staff attention). Moreover, a
shortcoming in previous studies has been a failure to verify (through standardized
assessment) the malingering status of those patients assumed to be non-malingering.
Thus, NGBRI patients were given additional malingering screening measures (NIM
scale, M-Test, and DCT) to rule out the possibility of malingering. All NGBRI
subjects were paid two dollars for their participation.
Scoring Procedures. Following the collection of data, the MFIT protocols for
all subjects (excluding identifying information other than the study number) were
scored along the specified quantitative and qualitative dimensions (see Table 2) by
two independent raters (doctoral candidates in clinical psychology with experience in
using the MFIT) blind to subjects’ diagnoses and group membership. Raters were
given the opportunity to become familiarized with the scoring criteria and have
questions regarding these criteria clarified prior to rating the protocols. It was noted
there were some areas of confusion regarding the scoring criteria for Primacy Effect,
Capitalization, Row Perseveration, and Wrong Item errors. This was clarified through
joint discussion and the scoring criteria were revised (see italicized print in Table 2).
After the ratings were completed, the agreement between raters was assessed through
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC’s) and kappa agreement, where appropriate.
As a check for accuracy, interrater reliability (ICC and kappa) was also
calculated for the data derived from hospital records. This was accomplished through
selecting 20 subjects at random and having an independent rater (clinical psychology
graduate student not affiliated with the study) review the subjects’ hospital records and
complete the demographics form.
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Table 2
Scoring Procedures for the MFIT
Quantitative: Total number of items correctly recalled (regardless of location).
Qualitative: (scored for the total number of occurrences for each of these types, with
the exception of Primacy Effect, Capitalization, Roman Numeral, and Gestalt).
Primacy Effect -

the total number of items recalled from the first two rows of the
stimulus card, regardless of location.

Item Perseveration - repetition of an individual item (e.g., A A).
Row Perseveration - repetition of an entire row (differentiate from Capitalization
error).
Row Extension -

continuing the elements of a row (e.g., A B C D E).

Reversal -

reversing a symbol (e.g., “b” drawn as “d”).

Rotation -

rotating a correctly drawn figure by more than 30 degrees.

Capitalization -

drawing the row of small cap letters in large caps (must be in
the correct location, i.e. third row). Not counted in total score.

Roman Numeral -

drawing the tally marks as Roman numerals. Counted in total
score.

Within Row Error -

misordering the elements within a row (e.g., B A C).

Row Sequence Error- misordering of the rows (e.g., 1 2 3 before A B C).
Between Row Error - rearranging the items from two or more rows (e.g., A 2 B).
Wrong Item Error -

number of produced recognizable figures not on stimulus card
(differentiate from row extension).

Extraneous Element - number of indistinguishable or bizarre figures not on the
stimulus card (differentiate from row extension and wrong item
error).
Gestalt Error -

failure to reproduce a 3 x 5 configuration when 15 items are
present

Embellishment -

adornment or elaboration of recognizable characters (e.g.,
smiley face drawn in the circle); also include elaborate drawings
in place of the stimulus material
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Results
Interrater Reliability
MFIT Scoring Indices. The reliability between raters’ scoring of all subjects’
MFIT protocols was computed using primarily ICC. Kappa coefficients (percent
agreement corrected for chance) were used for the three qualitative variables scored
for their presence or absence (i.e., Capitalization, Roman Numeral, and Gestalt) (Table
3).
Table 3
Interrater Reliabilities for the Quantitative and Qualitative MFIT Scoring Indices
Scoring Index

ICC

Kappa

Total Correct (quantitative)

.97

---

Primacy

.95

---

Item Perseveration

.86

---

Row Perseveration

.94

---

Row Extension

.90

---

Reversal

1.00

---

Rotation

1.00

---

Within Row Error

.91

---

Between Row Error

.84

---

Row Sequence Error

.81

---

Wrong Item

.85

---

Extraneous Element

.98

---

Embellishment

.86

---

Roman Numeral

---

1.00

Capitalization

---

.95

Gestalt

---

*

Note. * Unable to compute kappa coefficient due to the low frequency of occurrence.
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Overall, the interrater reliability for the quantitative and qualitative scoring
indices was found to be at an acceptably high level (>.80), with more than half of the
indices (56%) over .90. Since such a high level of reliability was obtained, one rater
was randomly selected and her scores used for statistical analyses. Further, it was
noted the “Gestalt” error previously identified by Griffin et al. (1996) was found to
have occurred only once out of the 106 protocols. This qualitative score was therefore
eliminated from further analyses.
Hospital Records Review. To ensure the information from hospital records
was obtained accurately and reliably, 20 subjects were randomly selected to have their
records reviewed by an independent rater. This information was entered onto a
demographics form and subjected to analysis for interrater reliability through a
combination of ICC and kappa. The average reliability for all items was .895 (range
of .80 to 1.00), which is at an acceptable level of reliability.
Verification of Group Membership
The following is a summary of the information that went into the treatment
teams’ clinical decisions regarding patients’ malingering status. This was done to
better determine the accuracy of diagnostic decisions and estimate the probability of
malingering among the non-malingering samples.
Diagnosed Malingerers. Inclusion in the DM group was based upon a
diagnosis of malingering by the hospital interdisciplinary treatment teams. Diagnoses
were established primarily on the basis of behavioral observations by multiple staff
and in various situations (e.g., during initial psychiatric and psychological mental
status and competency evaluations, interactions on and off the unit). The most
frequently observed behavior was inconsistency in either the patient’s presentation or
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report of symptoms, as noted in 70.5% of cases. This was followed by an unusually
impaired or improbably poor performance on initial examinations (65.9%) and the
presentation of atypical or rare symptoms (50.0%). Less common were presentations
involving unusually or extremely severe symptoms (29.6%), vague descriptions of
symptoms (22.7%), highly inconsistent demonstration of abilities (18.2%) and
improbable or absurd symptoms (15.9%). Furthermore, most diagnosed malingerers
were observed to engage in a combination of at least three separate behaviors believed
to be indicative of malingering (Rogers, Gillis, Dickens, & Bagby, 1991). Based on
these observations, staff had determined that 6 patients were malingering cognitive
impairment, 4 were malingering psychosis, and 34 were malingering elements of both.
In the majority of cases the results of a formal psychological (malingering)
evaluation were used to confirm observations. Of the 44 patients in the DM group, 41
had been administered at least one malingering measure (primarily the SIRS, M-Test,
or DCT) in addition to the MFIT. Among the three patients who did not receive
additional assessment, one was highly uncooperative with efforts and had been
diagnosed as malingering on a previous admission. The other two had been diagnosed
on the basis of their symptom presentations, which were noted to be of a rather
extreme nature.
Of the 41 DM patients formally assessed, 37 (90.2%) met criteria for
malingering on at least one measure other than the MFIT. Specifically, 22 of the 30
patients given the SIRS were determined to be malingering elements of psychosis.
Among the 8 patients who “passed” the SIRS, 6 scored in the malingering range on
the M-Test, DCT, or both, as did 9 of the 11 patients who did not receive the SIRS.
Of interest is the finding that, among the four DM patients who did not score in the
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malingering range on any additional measure, three obtained extremely low MFIT
total scores (2, 3, and 4) and one scored at the cutoff. Looking at historical factors,
nine patients had a documented preexisting psychiatric condition involving psychosis
(i.e., through previous hospitalizations, psychiatric diagnosis, and/or past treatment
with neuroleptics). Another three patients had a highly probable history of psychosis
(through independent reports but no available confirming records), and one had a
documented history of mental retardation. None of the DM had a documented or
confirmed neurological condition (e.g., through electroencephalogram or CAT scan)
and only two had a history of traumatic brain injury (both noted to present with
impairments inconsistent with either the extent or location of injury). Thus, a high
percentage (70.5%) of patients diagnosed as malingering were presenting with
problems involving psychosis, cognitive impairment, or both but without any prior
history of these conditions. However, almost one third of the diagnosed malingerers
had experience with these conditions and therefore may have been more sophisticated
(i.e., less blatant) in their presentations.
Finally, presence of an antisocial personality disorder (in conjunction with
other factors) is one of the criteria used for making a diagnosis of malingering (APA,
1994). Among the DM group, 14 (31.8%) met diagnostic criteria for antisocial
personality disorder. A chi-square analysis revealed this number to be significantly
different (p=.025) than the number of PT patients diagnosed with antisocial
personality disorder (6.3%).
Pretrial (non-malingerers). Although patients in this group were selected on the
basis they had not been suspected of or diagnosed as malingering, this did not rule out
the possibility that individuals in this group were malingering. It was therefore
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decided to look at other available information to better assess this possibility. In terms
of diagnoses, the primary Axis I diagnosis for this group was schizophrenia (most in
conjunction with a substance abuse diagnosis), and the primary Axis II diagnosis was
mental retardation (see Table 4). Among the 32 PT patients, only 10 (31.3%) had no
prior documented history of either psychosis or mental retardation. A chi-square
revealed this number to be significantly different from the number of DM patients
with no prior history, X2 (4, N=76) = 11.092, p=.001.
Table 4
Primary Axis I and Axis II Diagnoses for the Two Non-Malingering Groups

Diagnosis

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

AXIS I
Schizophrenia
Substance Abuse
Major Depression
Substance-Induced Dementia
Organic Mental Disorder
None
Other

14 (43.8%)
6 (18.8%)
5 (15.6%)
3 (9.4%)
2 (6.3%)
1 (3.1%)
1 (3.1%)

21 (70.0%)
2 (6.7%)
3 (10.0%)
0 (0.0%)
1 (3.3%)
0 (0.0%)
3 (10.0%)

AXIS II
Mental Retardation (Mild)
Borderline Intellect

15 (46.9%)
7 (21.9%)

3 (10.0%)
4 (13.3%)

Among the reasons for administration of the MFIT, 12 patients were given the
MFIT as part of a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation involving potential
memory problems. Another 13 were given the MFIT as part of an overall diagnostic
assessment, one in which the patient was presenting with acute and severe symptoms
(typically disorganization). Staff had determined that four of these patients were
experiencing a first episode of psychosis. The MFIT was given as a check for level of
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effort on competency evaluation and personality/intellectual assessment in six cases.
Only one patient received the MFIT as part of a comprehensive malingering
evaluation, although he had never been suspected of actual malingering by the hospital
staff (i.e., one sanity commission member was uncertain and suggested the possibility
be ruled out through assessment).
Despite the absence of true suspicion of malingering, 20 PT patients had been
given the SIRS, M-Test, or DCT, either alone or in combination. This is common
practice within forensic settings, given the legal implications and potential serious
nature of some patients’ charges (e.g., death penalty in First Degree Murder cases).
None of the 13 patients given the SIRS were found to be malingering on this measure,
neither were the 5 patients who received only the M-Test or the 2 patients who only
received the DCT. Of the PT patients who received the M-Test (N=14), only one
scored in the malingering range when using the original criteria of Beaber et al.
(1985), whereas two would have fallen in this range using the revised criteria of
Rogers, Bagby, and Gillis (1992). Using Rey’s original scoring criteria (Lezak, 1983),
three patients scored in the malingering range on the DCT, whereas two would have
done so using the criteria of Binks et al. (1997). In none of these cases did an
individual who scored in the malingering range on one test do so on a second test.
Examining hospital staffs’ behavioral observations of PT patients, only three
behavioral indicators suggestive of malingering (Rogers et al., 1991) were observed
with any degree of regularity. The most frequently observed behavior was unusually
impaired or improbably poor performance on initial examinations by seven patients
(21.9%). This was followed by inconsistency in the presentation or report of
symptoms (12.5%) and unusually severe or extreme symptoms (9.4%). However,
56

staff indicated these behaviors were most likely due to either acute psychosis or
impaired intellectual functioning, which combined with the results of standardized
assessment would indicate the probability of malingering to be rather low in this
sample.
NGBRI Controls. To confirm the non-malingering status of the NGBRI group,
participants were given additional malingering screening measures including the MTest, DCT, and Negative Impression Management (NIM) scale of the PAI. It was
found that no one scored above the suggested cutoff for malingering on the NIM
(M=4.43, SD=3.58, range = 0 to12). Only one NGBRI participant scored in the
malingering range using the original DCT criteria, whereas two fell in the malingering
range when using the criteria of Binks et al. (1997). On the M-Test, six patients
scored in the malingering range when using the original criteria, a number that
doubled when using the revised and improved criteria of Rogers, Bagby, and Gillis
(1992). The poor performance on this measure was not entirely surprising, given the
aforementioned problems with variable rates of sensitivity and specificity for this
measure (Smith, 1997). Additionally, Hankins, Barnard, and Robbins (1993) noted
that one problem with the M-Test was that it is essentially a cognitive task, and found
that the cognitive status (level of cognitive impairment) of the individual could
significantly impact their ability to engage in the task. This finding was confirmed in
the current sample through significant correlations (p<.05) between BPRS-E items
reflecting cognitive status (i.e., disorientation and conceptual disorganization) and the
total M (malingering) scale items (r=.315 and .338, respectively).
These results appear to verify the non-malingering status of patients in the
NGBRI group. Only one NGBRI patient scored in the malingering range on more
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than one measure (M-Test or DCT). However, this was the case only when the
revised M-Test scoring criteria were used, which in turn appear to have less specificity
than the original scoring criteria, at least for this sample. Moreover, this patient had a
longstanding and documented history of mental health problems involving both
mental retardation and schizophrenia (i.e., five previous hospitalizations), and had
recently obtained a WAIS-3 IQ of 55. It was therefore decided his performance was
most likely attributable to genuine psychiatric problems and low IQ and he was
retained for the study. A breakdown of patients’ malingering classification on each of
the three primary malingering measures is provided in Tables 5 to 7.
Table 5
Malingering Classification of DM and PT Patients Using the SIRS
Classification

DM
(N=30)

Malingering

22 (73.3%)

0 (0%)

8 (26.7%)

13 (100%)

Not Malingering

PT
(N=13)

Table 6
Malingering Classification of DM, PT, and NGBRI Patients Using the DCT

Classification
(Grouped Time > Ungrouped Time)
Malingering
Not Malingering
(Total Number of Errors)
Malingering
Not Malingering

DM
(N=23)

PT
(N=12)

NGBRI
(N=30)

13 (56.5%)
10 (43.5%)

3 (25.0%)
9 (75.0%)

1 (3.3%)
29 (96.7%)

2 (8.7%)
21 (91.3%)

2 (16.7%)
10 (83.3%)

2 (6.7%)
28 (93.3%)
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Table 7
Malingering Classification of DM, PT, and NGBRI Patients Using the M-Test

Classification

DM
(N=36)

PT
(N=14)

NGBRI
(N=30)

(Original Criteria)a
Malingering

26 (72.2%)

1 (7.1%)

6 (20.0%)

Not Malingering

10 (27.8%)

13 (92.9%)

24 (80.0%)

29 (80.6%)

2 (14.3%)

12 (40.0%)

7 (19.4%)

12 (85.7%)

18 (60.0%)

(Revised Criteria)b
Malingering
Not Malingering

Note: a Original criteria of Beaber et al. (1985), with malingering indicated by a score
of > 4 positively endorsed M-scale items.

b

Revised criteria of Rogers, Bagby, &

Gillis (1992), with malingering indicated by a score of < 4 on selected Rule Out items
and > 2 on selected Rule In items.
Demographic Data Analysis
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine group
differences on the demographic variables of age and education. There was a
significant difference between groups for age (F[2,103] = 4.486, p = .014), and a post
hoc test for Least Significant Differences (LSD) revealed the NGBRI control group to
be significantly older than both the PT and DM patients (both p’s <.05). There was
also a significant group difference for years of education (p = .021), which a post hoc
LSD test revealed to be attributable to patients in the DM group having fewer years of
education than the PT group (p = .007). A chi-square analysis did not reveal any
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differences between the three groups in terms of racial composition, X2 (2, N=106) =
2.795, p = .247 (Table 8).
Table 8
Demographic Variables by Group
Demographic
Variable
Age
Education

DM
(N=44)

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

31.55a (10.55)

32.94b (11.02)

38.63a b (8.91)

8.14a (2.61)

9.78a (2.55)

9.20 (2.55)

Ethnicity
Caucasian
African-American

5

8

7

39

24

23

Note: a b Denotes groups which significantly differed at the .05 level.
That NGBRI controls were significantly older was not unexpected, as this legal
status is not typically obtained until after competency restoration efforts have been
completed and the individual has been through the process of trial. However, previous
findings of a significant correlation between age and the total number of MFIT items
recalled (Griffin et al., 1996; Hays et al., 1993) indicates the need to co-vary for the
effects of age in subsequent analyses. With regard to education, of primary
importance is the relative equivalence of the two non-malingering groups (PT and
NGBRI) on this variable. More precisely, it would be difficult to ascertain the true
effects of educational level on the MFIT performance of the DM group since their
scores were of dubious validity. Also, the educational level of this group was of
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questionable validity as it was often obtained through self-report pursuant to difficulty
in procuring school records.
In examining the relevance of comparison groups (Rogers & Cruise, 1998),
there were no significant differences between groups on those variables reflecting
criminal background. Specifically, one-way ANOVAs revealed no significant
differences between DM, PT, and NGBRI patients in the total number of arrests prior
to hospitalization (F[2, 103] = .581, p = .561), total number of felony convictions (F[2,
103] = .928, p = .399), or total number of misdemeanor convictions (F[2, 103] =
1.249, p = 2.91) (Table 9).
Table 9
Mean Number of Prior Arrests, Felony, and Misdemeanor Convictions by Group
Historical
Variable

DM
(N=44)

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

Total Prior Arrests

9.43 (10.66)

7.56 (9.82)

7.27 (7.16)

Total Felony Convictions

1.02 (1.37)

0.53 (1.14)

0.93 (2.23)

Total Misdemeanor Convictions

1.07 (1.77)

1.78 (3.70)

0.83 (1.68)

The three comparison groups were found to be relatively homogenous in terms
of the primary (i.e., more serious) commitment charge, as indicated by a nonsignificant chi-square, X2 (12, N=106) = 13.566, p=.329 (Table 10). Of interest is the
finding that approximately half of all patients had been involuntarily committed for
violent offenses against person (e.g., murder, aggravated rape, aggravated assault and
battery). These types of charges could potentially result in severe punishment (e.g.,
life imprisonment and death penalty), which presumably would provide stronger
incentives to malinger (Schacter, 1986a).
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Table 10
Percentage of Patients in Each Group by Primary Commitment Charge
Charge

DM
(N=44)

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

Murder
Attempted Murder
Other Violent Crimes Against Person
Non-Violent Crimes Against Person
Aggravated Theft/Property Crime
Minor Theft-Related Crimes
Drug-Related Offenses

20.5%
13.6%
18.2%
6.8%
20.5%
9.1%
11.4%

21.9%
18.8%
6.3%
3.1%
18.8%
9.4%
21.9%

16.7%
6.7%
33.3%
6.7%
26.7%
6.7%
3.3%

On the basis of these results, it would appear the three comparison groups met
the criteria of Rogers and Cruise (1998) for relevance in that they possessed similar
criminal backgrounds.
Quantitative Scoring
The original (quantitative) scoring method for the MFIT involved totaling the
number of items correctly recalled, with fewer than nine items recalled being used as
the cutoff for raising the suspicion of malingering (Lezak, 1976). Applying this
criteria to patients’ MFIT protocols, approximately 21 of the 44 DM patients would
have been correctly suspected of malingering, providing a sensitivity of 47.7% and a
false negative rate of 52.3%. For the two non-malingering groups, a high false
positive rate of 43.8% was obtained for PT patients, although a more encouraging
false positive rate of 13.3% was found for NGBRI patients. It was also found that the
average number of items recalled by DM patients fell below the 9-item cutoff
(M=8.27, SD=4.05), while that for the non-malingering PT (M=9.78, SD=3.02) and
NGBRI patients (M=11.90, SD=3.18) fell above the cutoff. Using a one-way
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ANOVA, a significant between-groups difference was found in mean total scores
(p<.001), which a post hoc LSD test revealed to be attributable to NGBRI patients
scoring higher than both PT patients (p=.020) and DM patients (p<.001). These
results were virtually unchanged when using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to
control for the effects of age (p<.001). A breakdown of the number of patients in each
group by quantitative scores is provided in Table 11.
Table 11
Number of Patients in Each Group by Quantitative MFIT Scores
Total Items
Recalled

DM
(N=44)

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

3 (6.8)
4 (15.9)
2 (20.5)
3 (27.3)
5 (38.6)
2 (43.2)
2 (47.7)
9 (68.2)
3 (75.0)
2 (79.6)
1 (81.8)
0 (81.8)
2 (86.4)
6 (100)

0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (3.1)
3 (12.5)
6 (31.3)
4 (43.8)
2 (50.0)
2 (56.3)
4 (68.8)
5 (84.4)
0 (84.4)
1 (87.5)
4 (100)

0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (3.3)
1 (6.7)
0 (6.7)
2 (13.3)
0 (13.3)
3 (23.3)
1 (26.7)
2 (33.3)
7 (56.7)
0 (56.7)
4 (70.0)
9 (100)

Note. Cumulative percentage in parentheses.
Hypothesis 1. In the first hypothesis it was predicted that non-malingering
patients would obtain significantly higher total MFIT scores than malingering patients.
While the finding of a significant difference in quantitative scores between NGBRI
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and DM patients lends partial support to this hypothesis, that PT and DM patients did
not significantly differ was contrary to expectations. This is of greater concern as the
PT and DM patients are most likely to receive the MFIT in clinical settings.
In terms of validity (sensitivity/false negatives > false positives/specificity)
and effectiveness (base rate > false positives + false negatives or 1- base rate > false
positives + false negatives), the traditional quantitative scoring method was found to
be valid for differentiating both PT (.477/.523 > .438/.562) and NGBRI patients
(.477/.523 > .133/.867) from DM. However, this method did not appear to be an
effective indicator for malingering with this sample. Specifically, the combined error
rates for PT and DM (.303+.184) and NGBRI and DM (.311+.054) were in excess of
the estimated malingering base rate among criminal defendants (16%; Rogers et al.,
1998). These results attest to the need to examine alternative scoring methods that
might improve the efficacy of the MFIT.
Qualitative Scoring
Contrary to the findings of Griffin et al. (1996), a relatively high base rate for
qualitative errors was found among all three patient groups (Table 12). Among the
DM group, only 25% made but one type of qualitative error, and over half (52.3%)
made two or more distinct types of errors. Among the non-malingering PT and
NGBRI groups these rates were 46.9% and 36.7% for one qualitative error type, and
40.6% and 46.7% for two or more qualitative error types, respectively. A one-way
ANOVA revealed no significant differences between these groups in terms of the
average number of distinct error types (F[2, 103] = .599, p = .551) or the total number
of all errors made (F[2, 103] = .242, p = .786).
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Table 12
Number of Patients in Each Group by the Number of Distinct Qualitative Error Types
Group
Number of Distinct
Error Types

DM
(N=44)

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

0

10 (22.7%)

4 (12.5%)

5 (16.7%)

1

11 (25.0%)

15 (46.9%)

11 (36.7%)

2

16 (36.4%)

4 (12.5%)

6 (20.0%)

3

5 (11.4%)

3 (9.4%)

7 (23.3%)

4

1 (2.3%)

4 (12.5%)

1 (3.3%)

5

1 (2.3%)

1 (3.1%)

0

6

0

1 (3.1%)

0

This would indicate that malingering forensic patients did not make more
qualitative errors overall than their non-malingering counterparts. As such, the focus
is now shifted to examining group differences in the specific types of qualitative errors
made. A breakdown of the number of patients within each group making each of the
identified types of qualitative errors is provided in Table 13.
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Table 13
Number of Patients in Comparison Groups Making Each Qualitative Error
Group
Qualitative
Error

DM
(N=44)

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

p

Item Perseveration

8 (18.2%)

6 (18.8%)

3 (10.0%)

.566

Row Perseveration

6 (13.6%)

1 (3.1%)

4 (13.3%)

.273

Roman Numeral

3 (6.8%)a

1 (3.1%)b

7 (23.3%)a b

.020

Capitalization

2 (4.6%)a

7 (21.9%)a

4 (13.3%)

.074

Within Row

14 (31.8%)

11 (34.4%)

9 (30.0%)

.933

Between Row

9 (20.5%)

2 (6.3%)

2 (6.7%)

.096

Row Sequence

7 (15.9%)

7 (21.9%)

10 (33.3%)

.211

Row Extension

2 (4.6%)

1 (3.1%)

2 (6.7%)

.804

Wrong Item

9 (20.5%)

12 (37.5%)a

4 (13.3%)a

.066

Extraneous Element

3 (6.8%)

6 (18.8%)

5 (16.7%)

.254

Embellishment

4 (9.1%)

3 (9.4%)

4 (13.3%)

.821

Reversal
Rotation

1 (2.3%)
3 (6.8%)

1 (3.1%)
2 (6.3%)

0 (0%)
0 (0%)

.645
.353

Note.

a

and b denote groups differing from each other at the .05 level of significance

using Fisher’s Exact Test of Significance. p represents the overall significance level
for chi-square.
Hypothesis 2. The second study hypothesis was that non-malingering patients
would make more qualitative errors involving perseveration, misordering of elements,
character reversals and rotations than malingering patients. This expectation was
based upon previous findings of these particular error patterns among the mentally
retarded and psychiatric patients (Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Greiffenstein et al., 1996;
Morgan, 1991). This hypothesis was not supported by the present results, as there
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were no significant group differences (using chi-square and Fisher’s Exact Test) for
errors involving perseveration (Item and Row Perseveration), misordering of elements
(Within Row, Between Row, and Row Sequence) or rotations and reversals of items
(Rotation and Reversal). In fact, it was found that very few non-malingering patients
made errors involving rotations and reversals, and there was a non-significant trend for
malingerers to make more errors involving misordering of elements between rows
(Between Row error) than non-malingering patients. The most frequently occurring
error among all groups involved a misordering of items within a row (Within Row
error).
Hypothesis 3. In the third hypothesis it was expected that DM patients would
make more errors involving bizarre and unusual reproductions and addition of
extraneous elements than PT and NGBRI patients (i.e., Griffin et al., 1996). Rather, a
chi-square analysis revealed these groups to be relatively equal in the number of
Embellishment (p=.821) and Extraneous Element errors (p=.254) (refer back to Table
13). In conjunction with the results from the second hypothesis, it would appear that
malingerers were just as likely to make those errors typically associated with genuine
psychiatric and intellectual impairment, while non-malingering psychiatric patients
were just as likely to make those errors believed to be indicative of malingering.
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis was that malingerers would recall fewer
items from the first 2 rows of the MFIT, i.e., fail to exhibit a primacy effect in their
recall. This was based upon the findings of Morgan (1991), that even individuals with
severe organic memory problems could recall these items and hence failure to do so
should suggest malingering. It was found that DM patients recalled an average of 4.30
(SD=2.12) items from the first 2 rows, as compared to 5.28 (SD=1.25) for PT patients
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and 5.27 (SD=1.26) for NGBRI patients. Using a one-way ANOVA, the overall
difference between groups was found to be significant (F[2, 103]=4.417, p=.014). A
post hoc LSD test revealed that both PT and NGBRI recalled more items than DM
(p=.013 and .016, respectively), and that PT and NGBRI did not significantly differ in
their recall of these items (p>.90). A breakdown of the number of patients in each
group by the number of items recalled from the first 2 rows is provided below (Table
14).
Table 14
Primacy Effect (Items Recalled from First 2 Rows) by Group Membership
Number of Items
Recalled

DM
(N=44)

PT
(N=32)

NGBRI
(N=30)

0

5

(11.4)

0

(0)

0

(0)

1

1

(13.6)

0

(0)

0

(0)

2

1

(15.9)

1

(3.1)

0

(0)

3

10 (38.6)

5

(18.8)

6

(20.0)

4

2

(43.2)

0

(18.8)

2

(26.7)

5

2

(47.7)

4

(31.3)

0

(26.7)

6

23 (100)

22 (100)

22 (100)

Note. Cumulative percentage in parentheses.
The majority of all patients recalled more than three items from the first 2
rows. Only one non-malingering patient (PT) recalled fewer than three items,
compared to 7 (15.9%) of the malingerers. In fact, a closer inspection of the data
revealed that the PT patient who recalled only two primacy items still had a
quantitative score above the cutoff, whereas all of the DM patients exhibiting a
primacy score of two or less fell below the 9-item cutoff. Furthermore, 60% of the PT
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and 66.7% of the NGBRI patients who had primacy scores of three produced
quantitative scores above the 9-item cutoff, as compared to only 20% of the
malingerers who had primacy scores of three. These findings suggest that failure to
recall three or more items from the first 2 rows is highly indicative of malingering,
particularly when combined with failure to recall 9 or more total items. Furthermore,
it is noted that failure to recall six items from the first 2 rows resulted in improved
classification over the total quantitative score for the PT group (specificity of 68.7%),
whereas the classification (sensitivity) for DM remained unchanged. This would
indicate that one would do better by simply calculating primacy scores.
Before proceeding to the final study hypothesis, it is noted significant betweengroups differences occurred on those qualitative variables (Roman Numeral,
Capitalization, and Wrong Item) for which there was no a priori hypotheses. No
hypotheses were offered for these variables for two reasons. First, these particular
errors had only been identified and examined through one previous investigation
(Griffin et al., 1996), with the resulting conclusion that both reflected “artifacts of
illness.” This was because one error (Roman Numeral) was found significantly more
among normal controls and the other (Wrong Item) significantly more among the
severely ill. Consistent with their conclusions, it was found that significantly more
NGBRI patients made Roman Numeral errors than both PT and DM (Fisher’s Exact
Test, p < .05), and significantly more PT patients made Wrong Item errors than
NGBRI (p < .05) (refer to Table 13).
Second, there appears to be a lack of consensus that the Capitalization error
should be counted as an actual error. This was evident in discussions with the two
raters for this study as well as consultations with four clinical psychologists from
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forensic settings. It was found that significantly more PT patients made this error than
DM patients (Fisher’s Exact Test, p < .05). Based upon these factors, it was decided
to recalculate the quantitative scores for all patients to include those items previously
counted wrong due to a Capitalization error (refer back to Table 2). Inclusion of these
items increased the total (quantitative) scores to above the 9-item cutoff for one
NGBRI, four PT, and no DM patients. This resulted in improved false positives and
specificity for both PT (43.8/56.2 to 31.3/68.7) and NGBRI (13.3/86.7 to 10.0/90.0),
with no change in the sensitivity and false negatives for DM (47.7/52.3). However,
the combined false positive and false negative error rates for PT and DM (43.4%) and
NGBRI and DM (35.1%) still exceeded the established base rate for malingering
(16%).
Hypothesis 5. In the final hypothesis it was predicted that a combination of
both quantitative and qualitative variables would provide better discrimination
between malingerers and non-malingerers than the quantitative score alone. This was
demonstrated to some extent in the last section, where considering the Primacy Effect
and total score together strengthened suspicions about malingering and where
correcting the total score for Capitalization errors resulted in improved classification
for non-malingerers. Another method for exploring this hypothesis is through the use
of linear discriminant analysis (LDA), a statistical procedure that allows one to
determine the best combination of variables for differentiating between two or more
groups.
The independent (predictor) variables for LDA were derived as follows. First,
since the total score yielded better discrimination among groups after being corrected
for Capitalization errors, the corrected total score was entered as the quantitative
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variable. Since Item and Row Perseveration errors are essentially measures of the
same phenomenon (i.e., repetition), they were combined into a single variable
(Perseverative errors). This was also done for Reversal and Rotation errors, as these
are both errors involving the spatial rotation of items (letters and objects,
respectively). Age was entered as an independent variable to control for its effects on
scores. The Roman Numeral and Wrong Item errors were omitted from this analysis
since there were no a priori hypotheses for these variables and they appeared to
contribute more to differentiation between the two non-malingering groups (i.e.,
“artifacts of illness”). This resulted in 11 independent variables (Table 15), which fits
within the recommended criteria for LDA of having 10 subjects per independent
variable (Pedhazur, 1982). PT and NGBRI patients were grouped together to form a
single “non-malingering” (NM) group (N=62), with group status (DM vs. NM) as the
dependent variable.
Table 15
Independent Variables Used in the Linear Discriminant Analysis
Variable

Wilks’
Lambda

Level of
Significance

Canonical
Correlation

Corrected Total Score
Primacy Effect
Age
Between Rows
Perseveration
Row Sequence
Extraneous Element
Rotations
Embellishment
Within Row
Row Extension

.868
.952
.962
.962
.977
.981
.981
.992
.999
1.000
1.000

.000
.024
.047
.046
.123
.163
.157
.368
.728
.834
.835

.636
.366
.322
-.323
-.248
.224
.228
-.144
.056
.034
.033
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In the initial step of LDA, it was found that the Wilks’ lambda (ratio of the
within-groups sum of squares to the total sum of squares) for the Corrected Total
Score, Primacy Effect, Age, and Between Rows error were all significant using
univariate F-tests (all p’s<.05). This indicates that the proportion of variance in these
scores attributable to differences between malingerers and non-malingerers was
significant. However, an inspection of the canonical correlations (correlation between
predictor variable and the resulting discriminant function) revealed that only four of
the nine predictor variables for which there was an a prior hypothesis went in the
expected direction. Specifically, higher scores on those variables with negative
canonical correlations were more associated with malingering, whereas higher scores
on variables with positive correlations were associated with non-malingering. Thus,
contrary to hypotheses the presence of Between Rows, Perseveration, and
Rotation errors were associated more with malingering and Extraneous Element and
Embellishment errors were associated more with non-malingering.
Next, the discriminative ability of all independent variables (that were not
linear combinations of the other independent variables) was determined through a
forced-entry LDA with a minimum entry tolerance criteria of .001. This method was
chosen as it allows for the maximum number of variables to be examined, given the
information provided by a variable about group discrimination has not already been
supplied by the other variables in the equation (Norusis, 1988). It was found that all
of the variables in Table 15 met minimum tolerance criteria and thus were used in the
analysis. The resulting Wilks’ lambda for the discriminant function was .726,
indicating the function accounted for approximately 27.4% of the variance between
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groups. This was found to be statistically significant, X2 (11, N=106) = 31.490,
p=.001, and resulted in 79.2% of all patients being correctly classified (Table 16).
Table 16
Classification Results from the Linear Discriminant Analysis Using Forced-Entry
Actual Group
Predicted
Group

DM
(N=44)

NM
(N=62)

DM

30 (68.2%)

8 (12.9%)

NM

14 (31.8%)

54 (87.1%)

The overall rate for correct classification was substantially improved over that
obtained through both the quantitative (61.3%) and the (Capitalization) corrected
quantitative method (66.0%). A substantial increase was found in sensitivity (47.7 to
68.2%), and closer inspection of the data revealed that only 5 of the 32 PT patients
(15.6%) were incorrectly classified.
Although this is encouraging, replication is necessary to demonstrate the
validity and reliability of this method. Without the benefit of a second sample for
cross-validation, this was accomplished through the “leave one out” method. In this
method, each case in the sample is classified (malingering or non-malingering) using
the discriminant function that is derived from the entire sample minus that particular
case. It was found that the function using all of the variables did not cross-validate
well, as only 62.3% of the cases were correctly classified (Table 17). This falls back
within the range of the quantitative and corrected quantitative methods.
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Table 17
Classification Resulting from Cross-Validation of the Forced-Entry LDA
Actual Group
Predicted
Group

DM
(N=44)

NM
(N=62)

DM

23 (52.3%)

19 (30.6%)

NM

21 (47.7%)

43 (69.4%)

An alternative approach was to use only those independent variables making
the largest (and statistically significant) contribution to differentiating the two groups.
This was done through an LDA using a stepwise entry method, with minimization of
Wilks’ lambda as the entry criterion. This resulted in a Wilks’ lambda of .748 for the
overall function, which was significant, X2 (4, N=106) = 29.637, p=.000, and
accounted for 25.2% of the variance between groups. Only four variables were
retained for the function, which in order of the size of their pooled within-groups
correlation with the discriminant function were the total corrected score, Between
Rows error, age, and Extraneous Element. The only variable with a negative
canonical discrimination function coefficient (thus higher scores associated with
malingering) was the Between Rows error.
Use of this method resulted in 72.6% of the original cases being classified
correctly (56.8% of malingerers and 83.9% of non-malingerers) (Table 18). More
importantly, these results cross-validated when using the leave one out procedure, with
71.7% of the cases still being correctly classified. It was noted that only one patient
(NM) was re-classified incorrectly.
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Table 18
Classification Table for the Stepwise LDA and Cross-Validation
Actual Group
Predicted
Group

DM
(N=44)

NM
(N=62)

DM

25 (56.8%) 25 (56.8%)

10 (16.1%) 11 (17.7%)

NM

19 (43.2%) 19 (43.2%)

52 (83.9%) 51 (82.3%)

Note. Numbers in italicized print represent cross-validated classifications.
The combined use of quantitative and qualitative scores resulted in improved
classification, particularly for the two groups of greater clinical relevance (PT and
DM). Although this method met statistical criteria for validity (.568/.432 > .177/.823),
the combined error rate (27.4 %) remained above the estimated base rate for
malingering (16%). Thus, the combined method did not make the MFIT better than
base rate prediction alone.
Supplemental Analyses
Psychiatric Symptoms. The BPRS-E (Ventura et al., 1993) was given to all
NGBRI participants to obtain ratings of psychiatric symptoms. Since none of the PT
patients had been given this measure during hospitalization, symptom analyses were
restricted to those patients in the NGBRI group (N=30). A series of one-tailed
Pearson correlations were calculated between BPRS-E items and the MFIT scoring
indices. It was found that only three symptoms had a moderate and significant
correlation with total MFIT (quantitative) scores, and all three were psychotic
symptoms that can affect the ability to attend, concentrate, and organize cognitive
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processes. These symptoms were hallucinations (r = -.422, p = .01), disorientation (r=
-.428, p=.009), and conceptual disorganization (r = -.468, p=.005).
The only psychiatric symptoms significantly correlated with the total number
of qualitative errors were elevated mood (r=.429, p=.009) and flattened affect (r=.375,
p=.021). Only one qualitative error (Wrong Item) was significantly associated with
psychiatric symptoms, those being hallucinations (r=.552), disorientation (r=.587), and
conceptual disorganization (r=.413) (all p’s < .01), which appears to be consistent with
the speculations of Griffin et al. (1996) regarding “artifact of illness.” However, little
can be made of this or any other of these findings (or lack thereof) between the
individual qualitative errors and psychiatric symptoms, given the low number of
patients making these errors (i.e., less than one-third; refer back to Table 13).
Nonetheless, these results seem to indicate that psychotic symptoms which affect
one’s ability to attend, concentrate, and organize cognitive processes contribute to
lower MFIT recall.
Intelligence. Low intelligence has been significantly associated with decreased
MFIT recall (e.g., Hays et al., 1993). Fortunately, IQ estimates were available for 31
of the PT patients in this study. Looking back to Table 4, a larger proportion of PT
patients had been diagnosed with either mental retardation or borderline intellectual
functioning as compared to the NGBRI sample. A closer inspection reveals that it was
predominately these PT patients (10 out of 14, 71.4%) who had been incorrectly
classified based upon their quantitative scores. These diagnoses were confirmed
through the finding that the average IQ for PT patients was 70.06 (SD=7.97, range =
54 to 84), falling just on the border of mild mental retardation. A one-way ANOVA
revealed the average IQ for these patients to be significantly lower than that for
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NGBRI patients (p=.016), who had an average IQ in the borderline range (M=75.17,
SD=8.03, range = 55 to 91). Not surprisingly, the average IQ for DM patients (N=35)
was well within the mental retardation range (M=63.26, SD=8.33, range = 36 to 80), a
finding which supports the notion these patients were malingering problems with
intelligence as well as psychosis.
Consistent with the findings from previous investigations, there was a
significant positive one-tailed correlation between IQ and total MFIT scores for both
PT (r=.390, p=.015) and NGBRI patients (r=.356, p=.027). A significant positive
correlation was also found between IQ and the Primacy Effect for both PT (r=.362,
p=.023) and NGBRI patients (r=.313, p=.046). Contrary to the findings of Griffin et
al. (1996), there were no significant correlations for either patient group between IQ
and the total number of qualitative error types or the total number of qualitative errors
(all p’s>.10). Although a closer inspection of the relationships between IQ and the
individual qualitative errors was again hampered by the low number of patients
making individual errors, it was noticed there were no significant correlations between
any of these variables for the combined patient sample.
Age. Previous investigations (e.g., Griffin et al., 1996; Hays et al., 1993)
reported an inverse correlation between age and total MFIT scores as well as
qualitative errors. In the previous section it was found that age provided important
information for group discrimination (i.e., increasing age associated with nonmalingering status). Consistent with previous findings, age was found to be
significantly and inversely correlated with total MFIT scores for both PT (r= -.350,
p=.025) and DM patients (r= -.269, p=.038), though not for NGBRI (p>.150). There
were no significant correlations for any group between age and any of the qualitative
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indices. These findings seem to indicate that the primary effect of age is on recall per
se, an effect that may be magnified by the level of psychiatric impairment.
Incentive to Malinger. Finally, it was mentioned that individuals having more
at stake (e.g., facing severe punishment) would be more likely to engage in extreme
presentations and “overplay the role” (Rogers & Cruise, 1998; Schacter, 1986a). It
would therefore seem plausible that individuals facing larger prison sentences (or
capitol punishment) would be apt to perform more poorly on the MFIT, in turn
providing a contextual variable for interpreting results. Rather, there was not found a
significant correlation between maximum possible sentence and total MFIT items
recalled for patients who had been diagnosed as malingering (r= -.107, p=.244). This
would indicate the need to exercise caution when interpreting results within a given
context without considering other sources of information (e.g., behavioral
observations).
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Discussion
Since 1986, several investigations have established normative data for the
MFIT among various patient populations displaying memory problems (e.g.,
neurological disorders, patients recovering from head injury, psychiatric patients,
patients with mental retardation) (Back et al., 1996; Bernard & Fowler, 1990;
Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Hays et al., 1993; Morgan, 1991). There have also been a
series of investigations using simulation (e.g., Arnett et al., 1995; Bernard, 1990;
Bernard et al., 1993; Guilmette et al., 1994; Schretlen et al., 1991), differential
prevalence (Griffin et al., 1996; Lee et al., 1992), and known-groups designs
(Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995; Simon, 1994). The general consensus
has been that the MFIT is overly sensitive to genuine memory impairment (e.g.,
Schretlen et al., 1991), and the results of simulation and differential prevalence design
studies have indicated low sensitivity to simulated or suspected malingering of
memory problems.
A closer inspection of available data revealed this conclusion to be premature.
Lezak’s (1976) original contention was that only “significantly deteriorated” patients
would have difficulty in recalling nine or more items. This was supported by the
finding that patients with intracerebral hemorrhage, injuries resulting in severe global
cognitive impairment, or severe organic amnesia had the poorest recall on the MFIT.
Specificity among patients with neurological conditions was estimated to be
approximately 85.8% (combined data from Arnett et al., 1995; Bernard & Fowler,
1988; Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1992; Millis & Kler, 1995; Morgan, 1991).
When a more sound study design was used (known-groups), the overall sensitivity
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among civil litigants seeking disability or financial compensation for injuries was 64%
(Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Millis & Kler, 1995).
These discoveries offer better support for use of the MFIT as a floor effect
screening measure for malingered memory problems. However, there has been a
paucity of research with the MFIT among pretrial criminal defendants, a population
noted to malinger problems with memory and intellect in addition to psychosis (e.g.,
Gothard et al., 1995). Only two studies have been conducted so far; both were noted
to have restricted sample sizes and only one (Simon, 1994) provided estimates of
sensitivity and specificity. Furthermore, several MFIT investigations (Arnett et al.,
1995; Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Griffin et al., 1996; Guilmette et al., 1994; Morgan,
1991; Schretlen et al., 1991) indicated that a qualitative scoring approach (magnitude
of errors strategy; Rogers et al., 1993) might increase the detection ability of the
measure. However, only one study has systematically investigated this approach
(Griffin et al., 1996), and was limited through use of a design of questionable
ecological validity (differential prevalence).
The present known-groups study examined the validity and effectiveness of
both the traditional (quantitative) and qualitative scoring methods for the MFIT among
a larger sample of criminal forensic inpatients. This was done through examining the
MFIT protocols (administered under normal clinical conditions) from an archival
sample of pretrial criminal defendants independently diagnosed as malingering, and an
archival sample of pretrial criminal defendants for whom malingering had not been
suspected and subsequently ruled out. Since NGBRI status is the goal of the pretrial
malingerer, MFIT protocols were also collected from a sample of NGBRI patients for

80

purposes of comparison. The results of the scoring methods were examined within the
context of five study hypotheses, summarized as follows.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis dealt with the traditional quantitative scoring method (9item cutoff), and it was predicted that malingering patients would recall fewer total
items than non-malingering patients. As expected, the average number of items
recalled by DM patients fell below the 9-item cutoff whereas the average number for
the non-malingering PT and NGBRI patients fell above the cutoff. It was also found
that NGBRI patients recalled significantly more items than DM patients. However,
only partial support was gained as no significant differences were found between DM
and PT in the total scores, and the average total score of the NGBRI group was
significantly greater than that for PT. This raises concern, as the two non-malingering
groups exhibited significantly different scores and the two groups most likely to
receive the MFIT in criminal forensic settings (PT and DM) did not.
Several explanations can be offered for the significantly different quantitative
scores of the PT and NGBRI groups. The first is that the archival nature of the PT
group’s data and their pretrial status (i.e., incentive to malinger) would make it
difficult to rule out the presence of malingerers. However, close inspection of hospital
staffs’ behavioral observations of these patients in conjunction with the results of other
psychological (malingering) assessment would indicate this is not so.
A second explanation would be that differences in the severity of psychiatric
symptoms between the two groups contributed to differential performance. PT
patients were typically admitted (and tested) during an acute phase of illness, whereas
NGBRI patients had been hospitalized and treated for a longer time period. In fact, an
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inspection of available records indicated that 40.6% of the PT patients had not yet
received pharmacological treatment when they were assessed. By comparison, only
two NGBRI patients were on no medications, and all had been hospitalized for 10
months or more. Furthermore, it had been noted that several of the PT patients had
been determined by staff to be experiencing a first episode of psychosis, one typically
characterized by disorganization. Together these findings indicate that PT patients
had a more acute and severe symptom status. This is relevant, given that higher levels
of conceptual disorganization, disorientation, and hallucinations were significantly
associated with lower total scores among NGBRI participants. However, no firm
conclusions can be reached at this time since no psychiatric symptom ratings were
available for PT patients
A third and readily identified explanation is the contribution of lower
intelligence in the performance of the PT group. Several investigations reported
significant correlations between IQ and MFIT total scores (Goldberg & Miller, 1986;
Hays et al., 1993; Simon, 1994), with the lowest reported specificity among
individuals with both low IQ and (unspecified) psychiatric disturbance (Hays et al.,
1993). Not surprisingly, the average IQ for PT patients (70.6) was significantly lower
than that for NGBRI patients (75.2), and IQ was significantly correlated with the total
score for both groups. Furthermore, closer inspection of the PT patients falling below
the 9-item cutoff revealed that 57.1% had been diagnosed with mental retardation and
14.3% with borderline intellectual functioning. This occurred in conjunction with an
Axis I diagnoses of schizophrenia, major depression, or some form of substanceinduced cognitive disorder (dementia). It follows that the specificity for the PT group
(56.2%) fell between that for individuals with mental retardation (62.5%; Goldberg &
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Miller, 1986) and patients with various psychiatric problems and moderate to mild
mental retardation (32.4%; Hays et al., 1993).
Although there was a trend for PT patients to obtain higher total scores than
DM patients, this was not significant by conventional standards. This is important, as
these are the two groups to be differentiated under clinical conditions. The most likely
explanation for this finding can be found by way of comparison with the criminal
forensic MFIT study of Simon (1994). In Simon’s study, 85.7% of the diagnosed
malingerers fell below the 9-item cutoff, compared to only 47.7% of the diagnosed
malingerers in this study. Considering this with the assumption that malingering most
likely lies on a continuum (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; Resnick, 1993), it comes as no
surprise that Simon reported the malingerers in his study to be rather extreme in their
presentations. These discrepant rates of sensitivity raise the possibility that the
severity of malingering in the current sample was more varied, an assumption
supported by two findings. First, the behavioral observations of staff and the results of
malingering assessment for the DM group (Tables 5 to 7) indicate that several
individuals were less blatant in their efforts (i.e., exaggerating versus feigning).
Second, 13 DM patients had an established preexisting condition of psychosis, an
experience base that could potentially be used to develop a more sophisticated
presentation style (e.g., Pachana et al., 1998). Consistent with this notion, only one
DM patient with a preexisting psychosis fell below the cutoff, and even then by only a
single point.
As noted by Rogers and Cruise (1998), the assumption underlying a floor
effect measure is that the malingerer will “overplay” the role. Such an assumption
would necessarily limit the utility of the measure among individuals engaging in less
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extreme presentations, which seems to be supported by the present findings.
However, it would also indicate better utility in identifying those being more blatant in
their efforts. A closer inspection of the data in Table 11 reveals that only one nonmalingering (NGBRI) patient had a quantitative score of less than 5, this was an
individual with an established history of both psychosis and moderate mental
retardation (tested IQ of 55). Only two non-malingering patients obtained a total score
of 5, and both had IQ’s in the lower end of the mild mental retardation range (less than
65). In comparison, 12 (27.3%) of the DM patients had total scores of 5 or less, seven
of these had scores of 2 and 3.
In conclusion, one can be fairly confident in correctly identifying malingering
when very low MFIT scores (< 5) are obtained. Otherwise, there is sufficient
evidence that the traditional scoring method for the MFIT lacks specificity to the
combined influences of lower intelligence and psychiatric symptoms affecting the
ability to attend, concentrate, and organize cognitive processes. This method also
lacks sensitivity to less extreme or more sophisticated forms of malingering.
Together, these findings provide argument to examine alternative scoring methods,
preferably those less affected by IQ and symptom status. This was examined in the
remaining hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2
Several investigators (Goldberg & Miller, 1986; Greiffenstein et al., 1996;
Morgan, 1991; Schretlen et al., 1991) observed qualitative errors involving
perseveration, rotation, reversal, and misordering of items in the MFIT recall of
patients with low IQ, primarily mental retardation. Given the presence of individuals
experiencing problems with both psychosis and low IQ in criminal forensic settings
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(e.g., Hayes et al., 1997), it was hypothesized these types of errors would be observed
to a greater extent among the non-malingering patients. This hypothesis was not
supported, as no significant between-groups differences were found for Item and Row
Perseveration, Rotation, Reversal, Within Row, Between Row, and Row Sequence
errors. In fact, only three non-malingering patients made a reversal or rotation error,
and no significant correlations were found between IQ and these qualitative errors.
Given the average IQ for non-malingerers fell in the lower end of the borderline range,
this lack of significant findings is both unexpected and inconsistent with previous
investigations. While the current study design did not permit examination of this
issue, these results might suggest that the diminished cognitive functioning attributable
to (or in conjunction with) psychosis is qualitatively different from that due to other
organic factors.
There was observed an increased rate of errors involving perseveration and
misordering of elements among malingerers. Although there was a non-significant
trend for malingerers to make more Between Rows errors, it was later determined that
the proportion of variance in this score attributable to differences between malingerers
and non-malingerers was significant. While this is opposite of expectations, in
retrospect it is not surprising. The MFIT was designed to facilitate recall through the
grouping of related items (e.g., geometric shapes, first three letters of alphabet). The
misordering of elements within a row (Within Row error) was the most frequently
observed of all errors (one third of all groups), and it was observed this typically
involved misordering of the geometric shapes. This is expected, as there is no
“natural” order for these items (in contrast to “A B C”). However, placing together
unlike items (e.g., A 3 O) would not be expected, except perhaps in cases involving
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pronounced disorganization. The presence of this particular misordering error
therefore appears to be more indicative of malingering.
Last, the presence of “non-malingering” errors among the DM might be
explained by the presence of individuals with preexisting psychosis and low IQ.
However, a closer inspection of the data revealed that only 3 or less of the 13 patients
with an established preexisting condition made each of these specific types of errors.
Rather, the results indicate these qualitative errors (with the exception of Between
Rows) lack the ability to differentiate between malingering and non-malingering
criminal forensic inpatients, at least when considered in isolation.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis concerned the types of errors expected of malingerers.
On the basis of previous findings (Benton & Spreen, 1961; Griffin et al., 1996;
Guilmette et al., 1994), it was expected that DM would make more errors involving
bizarre and unusual reproductions (Embellishment) and addition of extraneous
elements than non-malingering patients. This would seem logical from a malingering
standpoint, as someone desiring to appear “insane” might accomplish this through
making “bizarre” errors. To the contrary, it was found that non-malingerers were just
as likely to make these types of errors as malingerers, and the canonical correlation for
these variables indicated a greater (although non-significant) association with nonmalingering status.
One possible explanation is that the bizarre reproductions among nonmalingerers reflects the bizarre or unusual thinking often seen in schizophrenia (APA,
1994). However, the small proportion of non-malingerers making these errors
prohibited further statistical analysis of their association with specific symptoms. A
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second and more likely explanation is that the hypothesis was predicated on findings
derived from studies of questionable ecological validity (i.e., simulation and
differential prevalence designs) (Rogers & Cruise, 1998). Nonetheless, these errors
did not significantly differentiate malingerers from non-malingerers.
Hypothesis 4
Morgan (1991) observed that a high percentage of patient with severe to
profound memory problems could recall the first 2 rows of the MFIT, i.e., exhibit a
primacy effect in their recall. Although this was not examined in a malingering
context, Morgan speculated that failure to exhibit a primacy effect might be indicative
of malingering. This was the fourth hypothesis, that non-malingerers would exhibit
more of a primacy effect in their recall compared to malingerers. Consistent with
expectations, it was found that both PT and NGBRI patients recalled significantly
more items from the first 2 rows than DM patients. Furthermore, no significant
differences were found between the two non-malingering groups.
Additional important findings were made. First, failure to recall at least 3 of
the 6 primacy items was highly indicative of malingering (only one non-malingering
patient fell in this range). Scores of 3 were also more common among malingerers,
although confidence in correct identification was increased when the total quantitative
score fell below the 9-item cutoff. Second, using a cutoff of less than 6 primacy items
resulted in improved specificity over the traditional scoring for PT patients (56.2 to
68.7%) while leaving sensitivity unchanged. Last, although lower primacy scores
were associated with lower IQ, there were no significant correlations between this
score and any of the 24 psychiatric symptoms assessed. That this score was
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unaffected by symptom status makes it a more desirable alternative to the quantitative
score.
An interesting aspect of the finding of a primacy effect is one would expect to
see a recency effect in the short-term recall of individuals with memory problems (i.e.,
Wiggins & Brandt, 1988). A possible explanation lies in the finding that individuals
with severe psychiatric disturbance have diminished processing speed (e.g., Malloy &
Duffy, 1994; Malloy & Richardson, 1994). The allotted MFIT exposure time (10
seconds) may therefore be inadequate for these patients, in essence they only recall
what they have had time to scan (i.e., first 2 rows). This would explain why the
quantitative score was affected by those symptoms reflecting or contributing to
impaired cognitive processing, whereas the primacy score was not. It is therefore
suggested that future investigations consider varying the length of exposure time for
these patients, in particular those who are acutely ill, as this may result in improved
specificity. It is also suggested that greater emphasis be placed on primacy scores.
Hypothesis 5
Last, it was hypothesized that a combination of quantitative and qualitative
scoring methods would provide better discrimination between malingerers and nonmalingerers. This was supported through three findings. First, as discussed in the
fourth hypothesis, quantitative scores falling below the cutoff in conjunction with
lower primacy scores were found to be more indicative of malingering. Second, given
the uncertainty that the Capitalization error should be counted as an error, quantitative
scores were recalculated correcting for the presence of this error. This resulted in
improved specificity for non-malingerers, in particular the PT patients (56.2 to
68.7%). Specificity for NGBRI patients increased marginally (86.7 to 90.0%), while
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sensitivity was left unchanged (i.e., none of the DM falling below the cutoff made this
type of error).
The third method through which this was examined was a linear discriminant
analysis involving both quantitative and qualitative variables. Only those variables
accounting for the largest proportion of variance between malingerers and nonmalingerers (total Capitalization-corrected score, between rows error, and extraneous
element) were used, controlling for the effects of age. Overall correct classification
rose from 61.3% for the quantitative method to 72.6%, and was maintained upon
cross-validation within the same sample (71.7%). Although specificity was at an
acceptable level (83.9%), there was only a small increase in sensitivity (47.7 to
56.8%). These results indicated that higher total scores (Capitalization corrected) and
extraneous elements were more indicative of non-malingering status, whereas lower
total scores and between rows errors were more associated with malingering.
A problem with incorporating the qualitative scoring method was that, despite
a high base rate for errors per se, less than one third of any group made any one
particular type of error. Such a low base rate for errors necessarily limits their
usefulness in discriminating between groups. This is similar to Griffin et al.’s (1996)
finding of a low base rate for qualitative errors, from which it had been concluded that
the presence of any “malingering” error be taken as evidence of feigning. The current
results do not support this recommendation, as malingerers were just as likely overall
to make those errors typically associated with genuine impairment while actual
patients were just as likely to make those errors Griffin et al. believed to be indicative
of malingering. Rather, these results suggest that the presence of between rows errors
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and extraneous elements need to be taken in consideration when interpreting total
MFIT scores in attempts to identify malingerers in criminal forensic inpatient settings.
Validity and Effectiveness
To summarize, 47.7% of diagnosed malingerers were correctly identified when
using the traditional scoring method. This figure slightly increased to 56.8% when
qualitative errors were incorporated. This is substantially less than the 85.7%
sensitivity among blatant pretrial malingerers (Simon, 1994) and just below the
estimated sensitivity of 64% for civil litigants. However, this was well above the
overall sensitivity computed from studies using simulation (37.5%) and differential
prevalence designs (22.4%).
In terms of specificity, 86.7% of NGBRI patients were correctly identified
through their MFIT scores. This was almost identical to that for Simon’s (1994)
NGBRI control group (85.7%) and a sample of patients with schizophrenia (87%;
Back et al., 1996). In comparison, only 56.2% of the non-malingering pretrial patients
were correctly identified, although this number increased substantially (to
approximately 80%) through incorporation of qualitative scoring. Incorporating
qualitative scoring produced only a marginal increase for the NGBRI participants
(90%).
The practical implication of these findings can be determined through
computations of validity and effectiveness for the various approaches. The traditional
scoring method was found to be valid for differentiating both groups of nonmalingerers from malingerers. This was also found to be the case when using the
Capitalization-corrected total score and the combined quantitative and qualitative
procedure derived through LDA. However, the traditional scoring procedure was not
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more accurate than utilizing base rate prediction alone in this regard, given the high
combined error rates for PT and DM patients (48.7%). This leaves a base rate
effectiveness range of approximately 49 to 51%, a number far in excess of the
estimated 16% base rate for malingering among criminal defendants (Rogers et al.,
1998). In comparison, combining the quantitative and qualitative methods produced a
lower combined error rate of 27.4%, yielding a base rate effectiveness range of 28 to
72%. Although this is still above the estimated base rate, it is only slightly above the
highest reported base rate of 25% for all forms of malingering (exaggeration to blatant
fabrication) within criminal forensic settings (Rogers, 1986).
Before making final conclusions about the effectiveness of the combined
approach, certain limitations need to be noted. First, the malingering base rate
estimate that was used (16%) was derived from a survey of over 500 experienced
forensic clinicians (Rogers et al., 1998). While such a large number of professional
opinions would seem valid, the lack of objective diagnostic criteria for malingering
combined with a failure to use objective measures undermines the validity of this
estimate. This restricts the conclusions that can be reached on the effectiveness of the
MFIT, or any other malingering measure, among criminal forensic populations. In the
least, it provides argument for objectively determining local base rates.
Second, the effectiveness equation does not take into account possible
measurement error in the determination of the combined error rate. Specifically, the
interval of confidence surrounding the estimated false positive and false negative rates
needs to be weighed when deciding if a measure is effective. While this is less of a
concern when the base rate and error rates are widely disparate, it becomes
problematic when the differences are minimal (as in the combined scoring approach).
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Such situations provide argument for cross-validating results before reaching any firm
conclusions about effectiveness.
Last, this study largely relied upon data from archival records. The time span
covered by this study (one decade) was considerable, and a number of professionals
were involved in making observations and assessments during this time. There were
also variations in backgrounds and training that could not be accounted for. These
factors make it difficult to determine to what extent, if any, that observations,
diagnoses, and administration of assessments were done in a completely reliable
fashion. Although this loss of experimental control has been a noted problem with
known-groups designs in malingering research (Rogers et al., 1993), it has been
considered an acceptable tradeoff given the potential gains in ecological validity (as
compared to simulation and differential prevalence designs).
Final Conclusions
To summarize, the final conclusions are offered for use of the MFIT in
criminal forensic settings:
1. The current results indicate the MFIT is accurate at identifying malingerers within
criminal forensic settings. Although it is not more accurate than the base rate at
achieving this goal, incorporating specific errors (between rows and extraneous
elements) with the total score can increase correct classification, mainly that for
actual patients. The large Type II error therefore necessitates the use of additional
malingering measures. However, it should be noted that use of base rate
predictions alone would not result in identification of any malingerers, as well
multiple indices are used in making this determination.
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2. The lack of effectiveness of the MFIT with this population can be attributed to
three factors. First, the low estimated base rate for malingering leaves little room
for error on any given measure. Second, the combined effects of hallucinations,
disorientation, conceptual disorganization, and lowered intelligence results in
increased false positives. Third, sensitivity for this measure is decreased
substantially when dealing with malingerers who are less blatant or more
sophisticated in their presentations.
3. Capitalization errors should not be counted against the total MFIT score, as this
reduces the amount of Type I error.
4. One can be more confident in correctly identifying malingering when a) very low
total scores (< 5) are obtained and b) there is a failure to recall at least three items
from the first 2 rows, particularly when total scores fall below the traditional
cutoff.
5. It has been noted that certain psychiatric symptoms (i.e., disorganized speech) are
difficult to malinger for extended periods of time (Resnick, 1993). Given the
association between this symptom and lower MFIT performance, it is
recommended that lengthy behavioral observations be conducted before
interpreting low MFIT scores. Likewise, the impact of low IQ on MFIT scores
argues for the importance of determining premorbid intellectual functioning (e.g.,
failure to meet developmental milestones, school records indicating severe
learning problems) before making clinical decisions.
6. Future MFIT research would benefit from a) obtaining psychiatric symptom
ratings for pretrial non-malingerers and b) examining the effects of increased
administration time on classification rates. Future malingering research would
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likewise benefit from identifying or developing neurocognitive malingering
assessments that are relatively impervious to the effects of low IQ and psychiatric
illness.
7. Last, the current results indicate the MFIT has utility as a screening (rather than
diagnostic) measure for malingering within criminal forensic settings, particularly
when dealing with more blatant forms of deception.
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Appendix A
The Rey 15-Item Memory Test
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Appendix B
The Negative Impression Management Scale
Please read each statement and decide if it is an accurate statement about you. Use the
following scale to rate each item:
0 = False, not at all true
1 = Slightly true
2 = Mainly true
3 = Very true

____ 1. Sometimes I cannot remember who I am.
____ 2. I have visions in which I see myself forced to commit crimes.
____ 3. Since the day I was born I was destined to be unhappy.
____ 4. I have three or four completely different personalities inside of me.
____

5. People don’t understand how much I suffer.

____ 6. Every once in a while I totally lose my memory.
____ 7. Sometimes my vision is only in black and white.
____

8. I don’t have any good memories from my childhood.

____ 9. I have severe psychological problems that begin very suddenly.
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Appendix C
The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
Date

Name/ID #
Hospital/Location
NA

1

2

Not assessed Not Present

3

4

Very Mild

Rater
Period of assessment

5
Mild

6

Moderate

7

Moderately Severe

Severe Ext. Severe

Rate items 1-14 on the basis of patient’s self-report during interview. Mark ‘‘NA’’ for symptoms
not assessed. Note items 7, 12, and 13 are also rated on observed behavior during the interview.
PROVIDE EXAMPLES.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Somatic Concern
Anxiety
Depression
Suicidality
Guilt
Hostility
Elevated Mood
Grandiosity
Suspiciousness
Hallucinations
Unusual Thought Content
Bizarre Behavior
Self-neglect
Disorientation

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Rate items 15-24 on the basis of observed behavior or speech of the patient during the interview.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Conceptual Disorganization
Blunted Affect
Emotional Withdrawal
Motor Retardation
Tension
Uncooperativeness
Excitement
Distractibility
Motor Hyperactivity
Mannerisms and Posturing

Sources of information
_____ Patient
_____ Parents/Relatives
_____ Mental Health Professionals
_____ Chart

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Explain here if validity of assessment is questionable
_____ Symptoms possibly drug-induced
_____ Underreported due to lack of rapport
_____ Underreported due to negative symptoms
_____ Patient uncooperative
_____ Difficult to assess due to formal thought
disorder
_____ Other _______________________________________
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Appendix D
Demographics Form

Study # __________

Years of Education

__________

Age

__________

Legal Status

__________

Race

__________

Charge(s)
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Maximum possible sentence:______________________________________________
# prior arrests:

_________ Felony

________ # convictions

_________ Misdem ________ # convictions
_________ City

________ # convictions

Diagnosis:
AxisI_______________________________________________________________
Axis II: _____________________________________________________________
Axis III: ____________________________________________________________
h/o head injury w/ LOC?
documented h/o neurological condition (include source and results of CT/MRI/EEG)?

h/o seizure disorder? (include treatments, last documented seizure)

prior diagnosis of malingering? (state by whom)
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Previous suspicion of malingering? (state by whom and what reasons/evidence)

Provide any documented h/o mental retardation (give IQ when available, source):

Provide any documented h/o mental illness (include diagnoses, treatments, duration,
source)

# of prior hospitalizations:
TEST DATA:
FSIQ: ___________ circle one

WAIS-R

WAIS-III

SILS

4-subtest WAIS-R
Referred for malingering evaluation?

If yes, was it for psychosis, cognitive (including memory) or both?

Behavioral observations by tx. team or psychologist:

Was malingering confirmed through other tests?

What were they malingering?
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RSPM

Other tests given:

____ SIRS

_____ total scales in definite range ( RS SC IA BL SU SEL SEV
RO)
____ total scales in probable range ( RS SC IA BL SU SEL SEV
RO)
___ total scales in indefinite range ( RS SC IA BL SU SEL SEV
RO)
_______ probability of malingering

______ M Test

______ total C items ______ total S items
______ total M items

_____ Dot Counting

______ time for ungrouped
______ time for grouped
______ total number of ungrouped correct
______ total number of grouped correct

_____ Digit Memory

______ level of performance

Other confirming sources of malingering (e.g., improbably poor performance on
neuropsych tests, MMPI or PAI scales, etc.):
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Appendix E
Consent Form
1. Title: Qualitative Scoring of the Rey 15-Item Memory Test in a Forensic
Population.
2. Where: Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System Forensic Division.
3. Contacts: If you have any questions, you may contact the following individuals
Monday through Friday between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.
Dr. David Hale
ELMHS Forensic Division
Ph. (225) 634-2661 ext. 65

James Martin
ELMHS Forensic Division
Ph. (225) 634-2661 ext. 72

4. Purpose of the Study: This is a research study which will look at the different types
of errors that are made by patients in a forensic hospital on the Rey 15-Item
Memory Test. We want to see if patients who are not malingering make different
types of errors than patients who are suspected of malingering.
5. Participants: This study is open to all people who have been found “Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity” and committed by the courts to the Forensic Division. People
who are currently experiencing severe psychological problems, who have been
found to be exaggerating their psychological and intellectual problems, or who
have a history of severe brain injury will be unable to participate.
6. Number of Participants: 30 patients at the Forensic Division will be enrolled in this
study.
7. Procedures: This study will only use those tests which are normally used at the
Forensic Division. You will first be asked to complete a short test of your
memory. Then you will be asked about any psychological problems you may or
may not have, such as feeling nervous, sad, or hearing voices. Last, you will be
asked to complete some tests which ask you true or false questions, questions
about how you generally see yourself, and tests which ask you to count dots and
solve problems. The whole study will only take one hour of your time.
8. Benefits: You will receive $2.00 for completing the entire study. The other benefit
is you will be helping us understand if using a different scoring method makes a
test more useful for forensic patients.
9. Risks: There are no risks for doing this study. However, if you should feel
uncomfortable you can refuse to answer questions or stop the study at any time.
10. Right to Refuse: You do not have to do this study if you do not want to. You can
also stop doing the study at any time. If you decide not to do the study or decide
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to stop the study, your decision will not affect your treatment at this facility or get
you in trouble with the staff. You will not be punished in any way or lose points
on the Level system.
11. Privacy: The information we get from you will only be used for this study, and is
not to be used by the courts or for your treatment at Forensic Division. This is an
anonymous study, which means your name will not be placed on any forms except
the consent form, and this is to be kept in a different file. That way, no one will
know who you are or how you did on these tests. Only the people listed above
will be able to look at your answers. After the study, we will destroy all of these
forms, so no one will know you did the study.
12. Financial Information: You will paid two (2) dollars upon completion of the entire
study. This money will be deposited directly to your patient account.
13. Alternatives: The alternative is not to participate in this study.
14. Withdrawal: Since your participation in this study is voluntary, you have the right
to stop at any time. This will not affect your treatment at Forensic Division or
place on the Level system. However, only those people who complete the entire
study will be paid the two dollars.
15. Removal: Participants who become disruptive, aggressive, or very psychotic
during the study will be removed from the study.
16. Signatures: The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been
answered. I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the
investigators. If I have questions about subjects’ rights or other concerns, I can
contact Charles E. Graham, Chairman, LSU Institutional Review Board, (225)
388-8692. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the
researcher’s obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by
me.

Signature of the Patient Volunteer

Date

“The study subject has indicated to me that he is unable to read. I certify that I have
read this consent form to the subject and explained that by completing the signature
line above, the subject has agreed to participate.”

Signature of Reader

Date

Signature of Witness

Date

Signature of Investigator

Date
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Vita
James Martin was born in Athens, Georgia, on July 7, 1966. He spent his
childhood and adolescent years with his mother, father, and two younger brothers in
Augusta, Georgia, and Gainesville, Georgia. Upon graduating from high school in
1984, he entered the University of Georgia, where he earned a Bachelor of Science
degree in psychology in 1988. From there he pursued a Master of Science in
psychology through Augusta State University. After receiving the degree in 1991, he
pursued work in the areas of neuropsychological testing and then
psychopharmacological research with patients with schizophrenia. Realizing the
importance of further education, he re-entered graduate school at the Illinois Institute
of Technology, where he began social-cognitive research with schizophrenia under the
guidance of David Penn, Ph.D. This work continued when he transferred with Dr.
Penn to Louisiana State University, and expanded into working with inpatients in the
state forensic hospital. His interests now include working with patients with
schizophrenia in both forensic and non-forensic contexts, utilizing new cognitivebehavioral therapies for treatment-resistant psychotic symptoms, and further
examining factors affecting neuropsychological test performance among patients with
schizophrenia. He currently resides in Gainesville, Georgia, with his Cajun-bred wife
(also a doctor in psychology) of four years and two daughters, ages 3 and 12, with
whom he enjoys outdoor activities.
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